Ruling Party Personalism and Central Bank Independence
This study shows that greater personalism in the support party of incumbent leaders increases the likelihood of attacks on central bank independence. Using data on levels of personalism in the incumbent party in democracies worldwide from 1991 to 2020, it finds that personalist governments are more likely to publicly pressure the central bank to shift monetary policy (nearly always with an eye toward loosening it), as well as more likely to set in motion legal changes that decrease central bank autonomy. This finding holds even when accounting for other known factors associated with central bank interference, such as populist posturing. Put simply, where leaders backed by personalist parties come to power, we are likely to see greater efforts to steer monetary policy and weaken central bank independence. The election of personalist leaders therefore signals potentially higher and unpredictable patterns of inflation in the years that follow.
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Work Title Ruling Party Personalism and Central Bank Independence Access Creators - Erica Frantz
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor
- Yasin Shafi
- Joseph G Wright
Keyword - personalism
- personalist parties
- central bank independence
- monetary policy
License In Copyright (Rights Reserved) Work Type Article Publisher - Journal of Politics
Publication Date January 1, 2025 Publisher Identifier (DOI) - https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/739779
Deposited March 23, 2026 Versions
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Version 1
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Updated Keyword Show ChangesKeyword
- personalism , personalist parties , central bank independence, monetary policy
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Updated Creator Joseph G Wright
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Added Creator Erica Frantz
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Added Creator Andrea Kendall-Taylor
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Added Creator Yasin Shafi
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Updated Publisher Identifier (DOI), Publisher's Statement Show ChangesPublisher Identifier (DOI)Publisher's Statement
- https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/739779
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/739779
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