A Framework for Investigating Animal Consciousness

An assessment of consciousness in nonverbal animals requires a framework for research that extends testing methods beyond subjective report. This chapter proposes a working definition of consciousness in terms of temporal representation that provides the critical link between internal phenomenology and external behavior and neural structure. Our claim is that consciousness represents the present moment as distinct from the past and the future in order to flexibly respond to stimuli. We discuss behavioral and neural evidence that indicates the capacity for both flexible response and temporal representation, and we illustrate these capacities in fish, a taxonomic group that challenges human intuitions about consciousness.

Droege, P., Braithwaite, V.A. (2014). A Framework for Investigating Animal Consciousness. In: Lee, G., Illes, J., Ohl, F. (eds) Ethical Issues in Behavioral Neuroscience. Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences, vol 19. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2014_278

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Work Title A Framework for Investigating Animal Consciousness
Access
Open Access
Creators
  1. Paula Droege
  2. Victoria A. Braithwaite
Keyword
  1. Animals
  2. Behavior
  3. Consciousness
  4. Fish
  5. Flexibility
  6. Goal-directed
  7. Pain
  8. Temporal representation
  9. Telencephalon
  10. Tool use
License In Copyright (Rights Reserved)
Work Type Part Of Book
Publisher
  1. Springer
Publication Date January 1, 2014
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2014_278
Deposited May 06, 2024

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Version 2
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  • Created
  • Updated Work Title Show Changes
    Work Title
    • Behavioral Evidence of Felt Emotions: Approaches, Inferences, and Refinements
    • A Framework for Investigating Animal Consciousness
  • Updated Keyword, Publisher, Publisher Identifier (DOI), and 2 more Show Changes
    Keyword
    • Animals, Behavior, Consciousness, Fish, Flexibility, Goal-directed, Pain, Temporal representation, Telencephalon, Tool use
    Publisher
    • Advances in the Study of Behavior
    • Springer
    Publisher Identifier (DOI)
    • https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.asb.2017.02.002
    • https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2014_278
    Description
    • <p>Felt emotional states are at the very heart of many concerns about animal welfare. However, some scholars express doubt that animals are able to have such experiences, and there is much debate about what types of evidence can be used to draw inferences regarding such feelings in animals. The objective of this review is to critically examine inferences regarding felt negative emotions in animals based on various types of experimental and observational evidence resulting from behavioral studies. This review takes three types of approach: the assessment of spontaneous responses to a noxious stimulus, changes in these responses following a drug treatment, and assessments of the animal's motivation to avoid the stimulus. In each case we provide examples from previous experiments and suggest refinements that overcome certain limitations to each approach. We suggest that studies using learned, flexible, context-dependent responses, and tasks involving discrimination and generalization of affective states induced by drugs may be especially useful. Although the various types of evidence can be used in combination to draw tentative inferences, conclusions regarding felt emotions still fall short of definitive. As an approach forward, we propose adopting an Affective Stance that posits specific felt emotions and tests the predictions that arise from this posit that are not predicted by other approaches to this issue.</p>
    • An assessment of consciousness in nonverbal animals requires a framework for research that extends testing methods beyond subjective report. This chapter proposes a working definition of consciousness in terms of temporal representation that provides the critical link between internal phenomenology and external behavior and neural structure. Our claim is that consciousness represents the present moment as distinct from the past and the future in order to flexibly respond to stimuli. We discuss behavioral and neural evidence that indicates the capacity for both flexible response and temporal representation, and we illustrate these capacities in fish, a taxonomic group that challenges human intuitions about consciousness.
    • Droege, P., Braithwaite, V.A. (2014). A Framework for Investigating Animal Consciousness. In: Lee, G., Illes, J., Ohl, F. (eds) Ethical Issues in Behavioral Neuroscience. Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences, vol 19. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2014_278
    Publication Date
    • 2017-01-01
    • 2014-01-01
  • Deleted Creator Daniel M. Weary
  • Updated Creator Paula Droege
  • Updated Creator Victoria A. Braithwaite
  • Published
  • Updated