Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization

Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies at one time rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations, which posits that the politics of reorganization is focused on government accountability. Viewing mass reorganization as a structured decision, it argues that choices about independence, agency organization and functional disposition have different impacts on the political costs of administrative policy making. Analyzing novel data from a recent British reorganization with sequential logistic statistical models provides substantial support for these claims. The study challenges the focus on organizational survival in the existing literature. By eschewing more fundamental political questions of democratic accountability, the prevailing approach masks essential politics, and in the context of this study, all influence of conflict due to party and agency policy positions.

Originally Published at 10.1017/S0007123416000077

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Work Title Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization
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Open Access
Creators
  1. Anthony M. Bertelli
  2. J. Andrew Sinclair
License CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. British Journal of Political Science
Publication Date July 14, 2016
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000077
Deposited January 22, 2024

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