The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking
This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero-sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of “adverse correlation” that is necessary and sufficient for zero-sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.
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| Work Title | The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking |
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| License | CC BY 4.0 (Attribution) |
| Work Type | Article |
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| Publication Date | October 4, 2024 |
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| Deposited | April 24, 2025 |
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