Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of renegotiation among players. We study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Our main result is that the limit of the set of payoffs from renegotiation proof equilibria is either a singleton or a connected subset of the Pareto efficient frontier. A simple sufficient condition for the latter to occur is also provided.

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Work Title Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
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Open Access
Creators
  1. Jean-Pierre Benoit
  2. Vijay Krishna
Keyword
  1. Repeated games
  2. Renegotiation
  3. Efficiency
License CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. Econometrica
Publication Date March 1993
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951553
Deposited August 06, 2022

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Version 1
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  • Created
  • Updated
  • Added Creator Jean-Pierre Benoit
  • Added Creator Vijay Krishna
  • Added Benoit and Krishna ECMA (1993).pdf
  • Updated License Show Changes
    License
    • https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
  • Published
  • Updated

Version 2
published

  • Created
  • Updated Publisher Show Changes
    Publisher
    • Econometrica
  • Published
  • Updated Keyword, Publisher Identifier (DOI), Publication Date Show Changes
    Keyword
    • Repeated games, Renegotiation, Efficiency
    Publisher Identifier (DOI)
    • https://doi.org/10.2307/2951553
    Publication Date
    • 1993
    • 1993-03
  • Updated