
Entry deterrence and dynamic competition: The role of capacity reconsidered
We study a model with sequential capacity choice and entry by firms into an industry. Post-entry competition is long term and firms compete by choosing prices. The complex role played by the capacity choice of the first mover is highlighted. In contrast to the conclusions derived from static or reduced form specifications, entry may be deterred only by choosing a low capacity level and charging a very high price. The arguments are used to provide an explanation of events in the US phosphorus industry.
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Work Title | Entry deterrence and dynamic competition: The role of capacity reconsidered |
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License | CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial) |
Work Type | Article |
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Publication Date | December 1991 |
Publisher Identifier (DOI) |
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Deposited | August 06, 2022 |
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