A Feminist Account of Global Responsibility

Contemporary philosophical discourse on global responsibility has maintained a nearly unwavering focus on justice. In response, in this article I explore an underrepresented element in global justice discussions: insights from feminist philosophy, and more specifically from the ethics of care. Through the concepts of interdependence, vulnerability, need and care, I develop a feminist global obligation – the global duty to care – and explore the distinctive vision it offers for the ground, scope and content of global responsibility. By analyzing contemporary theories of moral cosmopolitanism through the lens of cosmopolitan care, I reveal four shortcomings of cosmopolitan justice and suggest alternative concepts. Instead of the hyper-individualism of mainstream global responsibility theories, the global duty to care is thoroughly relational in nature. Aware of the difficulties that theories centering on idealized moral agents encounter, the global duty to care grounds itself in human vulnerability, dependence and need. Instead of positing an abstract moral agent, the global duty to care reverses the denial of difference. Finally, rather than endorsing the acontextuality of generic human agents, the global duty to care is fully situated and incorporates a critical function through which analysis of one’s role in global oppression is a moral requirement.

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Work Title A Feminist Account of Global Responsibility
Access
Open Access
Creators
  1. Sarah Clark Miller
Keyword
  1. ethics
  2. care ethics
  3. global responsibility
  4. cosmopolitanism
License All rights reserved
Work Type Article
DOI doi:10.26207/j9fa-9a86
Deposited October 15, 2019

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