CEO Pay Components and Aggressive Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure
<jats:p> We examine the relation between CEO pay components and aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures using CEO pay components as proxies for managers’ short- versus long-term focus. Specifically, we explore the extent to which short-term bonus plan payouts and long-term incentive plan payouts are associated with: (1) Managers’ propensity to exclude expense items in excess of those excluded by equity analysts; and, (2) The magnitude of those incremental exclusions. We find that long-term incentive plan payouts are negatively associated with the likelihood and magnitude of aggressive non-GAAP exclusions. Our results are consistent with managers reporting non-GAAP information less aggressively when they are more focused on long-term, rather than short-term, value. /jats:p
Black, CEO Pay Components and Aggressive Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure, 'Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance' (, ) pp. 0148558X2198990. Copyright © 2021. DOI: 10.1177/0148558x21989907. Users who receive access to an article through a repository are reminded that the article is protected by copyright and reuse is restricted to non-commercial and no derivative uses. Users may also download and save a local copy of an article accessed in an institutional repository for the user's personal reference. For permission to reuse an article, please follow our Process for Requesting Permission.
|Work Title||CEO Pay Components and Aggressive Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure|
|License||CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives)|
|Publication Date||February 15, 2021|
|Publisher Identifier (DOI)||
|Deposited||September 09, 2021|
This resource is currently not in any collection.