This paper is about two seemingly inconsistent theories of well-being and how to reconcile them. The first theory is perfectionism, the view that the good of a human is determined by human nature. The second theory is preferentism, the view that the good of a human lies in the satisfaction of her preferences. I begin by sketching the theories and then developing an objection against each from the standpoint of the other. I then develop a version of each theory that is meant to address the objection from the other theory. It turns out that these modified perfectionist and preferentist theories are mutually supporting and co-extensive. They can be combined into a new theory, perfectionist preferentism, which is an independently plausible theory of well-being.
This is the accepted manuscript version of a paper appearing in American Philosophical Quarterly, 59:2 (2022); 127-138.
|Work Title||Perfectionist Preferentism|
|License||In Copyright (Rights Reserved)|
|Publication Date||April 1, 2022|
|Deposited||July 30, 2022|
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