Multilateral Bargaining

We study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and we use it to establish links to the axiomatic theory of bargaining.

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Work Title Multilateral Bargaining
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Open Access
Creators
  1. Vijay Krishna
  2. Roberto Serrano
License CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. Review of Economic Studies
Publication Date 1996
Deposited July 04, 2022

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Version 1
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  • Created
  • Updated
  • Added Creator Vijay Krishna
  • Added Creator Roberto Serrano
  • Added Krishna and Serrano RES (1996).pdf
  • Updated Publication Date, License Show Changes
    Publication Date
    • 1996
    License
    • https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Version 2
published

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  • Updated Publisher Show Changes
    Publisher
    • Review of Economic Studies
  • Published
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