Relational contracting and network management

Our argument connects the management of relational contracts with the management of policy networks. Thinking about bilateral, horizontal extensions of governmental authority in a state of agents can be enhanced, we claim, because of the rich offerings of relational contracting theory. We review key results from economic theories of relational contracting, provide public sector examples, and present a set of testable propositions that suggest a rationale for the creation and expansion of policy networks through relational contracting and its management. Although adding theoretical leverage to research on public sector contracting, our approach provides one means of explaining the emergence of policy networks and implications for managing within them.

One of the greatest barriers to improving the administration of public programs in an era of extensive contracted operations is the failure to understand the nature of the relationships that emerge in that process. Cooper (2003)

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory following peer review. The version of record [Relational Contracting and Network Management. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20, Supplement 1 pi21-i40 (2010)] is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup033.

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Work Title Relational contracting and network management
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Open Access
Creators
  1. Anthony M. Bertelli
  2. Craig R. Smith
License In Copyright (Rights Reserved)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Publication Date December 2, 2009
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup033
Deposited January 22, 2024

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  • Created
  • Added SSRN-id3014335-1.pdf
  • Added Creator Anthony M. Bertelli
  • Added Creator Craig R. Smith
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    Description
    • Our argument connects the management of relational contracts with the management of policy networks. Thinking about bilateral, horizontal extensions of governmental authority in a state of agents can be enhanced, we claim, because of the rich offerings of relational contracting theory. We review key results from economic theories of relational contracting, provide public sector examples, and present a set of testable propositions that suggest a rationale for the creation and expansion of policy networks through relational contracting and its management. Although adding theoretical leverage to research on public sector contracting, our approach provides one means of explaining the emergence of policy networks and implications for managing within them.One of the greatest barriers to improving the administration of public programs in an era of extensive contracted operations is the failure to understand the nature of the relationships that emerge in that process.
    • Our argument connects the management of relational contracts with the management of policy networks. Thinking about bilateral, horizontal extensions of governmental authority in a state of agents can be enhanced, we claim, because of the rich offerings of relational contracting theory. We review key results from economic theories of relational contracting, provide public sector examples, and present a set of testable propositions that suggest a rationale for the creation and expansion of policy networks through relational contracting and its management. Although adding theoretical leverage to research on public sector contracting, our approach provides one means of explaining the emergence of policy networks and implications for managing within them.
    • One of the greatest barriers to improving the administration of public programs in an era of extensive contracted operations is the failure to understand the nature of the relationships that emerge in that process. Cooper (2003)
  • Updated