The political cost of public-private partnerships: theory and evidence from colombian infrastructure development

Infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) eschew traditional public management to provide distributive goods worldwide. Yet, in Colombia, the context of our study, both the promise of and voters' experience with PPPs hinder incumbent parties in elections when theories of distributive politics expect otherwise. We argue that negative experiences with PPPs introduce a sociotropic turn in individual voting: bad experience crowds out the possibility that promising a new project will improve a voter's own welfare. Studying what are, to our knowledge, all 109 Colombian PPP projects between 1998 and 2014, and over 8,700 individual survey responses, our evidence shows that vote intention for the incumbent executive or his party decreases as experience with more PPPs in respondents' districts increases. Our analysis and results introduce an important agenda for research into the political significance of these legacies of new public management.

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [Angulo Amaya, M.C., Bertelli, A.M., and Woodhouse, E.F. (2020). The political cost of public–private partnerships: Theory and evidence from Colombian infrastructure development. Governance 33, 771–788.], which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12443. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions: https://authorservices.wiley.com/author-resources/Journal-Authors/licensing/self-archiving.html#3.

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Work Title The political cost of public-private partnerships: theory and evidence from colombian infrastructure development
Access
Open Access
Creators
  1. Maria Camila Angulo Amaya
  2. Anthony Michael Bertelli
  3. Eleanor Florence Woodhouse
License In Copyright (Rights Reserved)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. Wiley
Publication Date August 26, 2020
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. 10.1111/gove.12443
Source
  1. Governance
Deposited September 09, 2021

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  • Added Creator Maria Camila Angulo Amaya
  • Added Creator Anthony Michael Bertelli
  • Added Creator Eleanor Florence Woodhouse
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