Asymmetric English Auctions

This paper studies equilibria of the n-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price, auction in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. Maskin (in: H. Siebert (Ed.), Privatization, Institut fur Weltwirtschaften der Universita¨ t Kiel, Kiel, 1992,pp. 115–136.) showed that if the values satisfy a ‘‘single crossing’’ condition, then the two bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium. In this paper, two extensions of the single crossing condition, the ‘‘average crossing’’ condition and the ‘‘cyclical crossing’’ condition, are introduced. The main result is that under either of these conditions the n-bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium.

Files

Metadata

Work Title Asymmetric English Auctions
Access
Open Access
Creators
  1. Vijay Krishna
License CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. Journal of Economic Theory
Publication Date 2003
Deposited April 04, 2022

Versions

Analytics

Collections

This resource is currently not in any collection.

Work History

Version 1
published

  • Created
  • Added Creator Vijay Krishna
  • Updated
  • Added Krishna JET (2003).pdf
  • Updated License Show Changes
    License
    • https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
  • Published

Version 2
published

  • Created
  • Updated Publisher Show Changes
    Publisher
    • Journal of Economic Theory
  • Updated License Show Changes
    License
    • https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
    • https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
  • Published