Corruption, Democracy and Privately Financed Infrastructure
<jats:p> Do political institutions moderate the influence of corruption on privately financed infrastructure projects? We argue that electoral competition incentivizes politicians to monitor bureaucratic corruption and focus on the public benefits of projects. Without such incentives, corruption is not monitored and the private benefits of bribes and favorable contract terms are responsible for increasing numbers of projects. Studying 116 countries between 1984 and 2012, we find that as public-sector corruption increases in democracies, no change in the number of projects is observed, while more projects emerge in non-democracies as corruption worsens. /jats:p
Bertelli, Corruption, Democracy, and Privately Financed Infrastructure, 'Administration & Society' (53, 3) pp. 327-352. Copyright © 2020. DOI: 10.1177/0095399720944548. Users who receive access to an article through a repository are reminded that the article is protected by copyright and reuse is restricted to non-commercial and no derivative uses. Users may also download and save a local copy of an article accessed in an institutional repository for the user's personal reference. For permission to reuse an article, please follow our Process for Requesting Permission.
|Work Title||Corruption, Democracy and Privately Financed Infrastructure|
|License||CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives)|
|Publication Date||July 31, 2020|
|Publisher Identifier (DOI)||
|Deposited||January 13, 2022|
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