Should straw polls be banned?

A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or “deliberating” before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal uses a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation. We show using examples how she can gain if she can choose the equilibrium played by the committee, or use a non-anonymous or non-monotone voting rule.

© This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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Work Title Should straw polls be banned?
Access
Open Access
Creators
  1. S. Nageeb Ali
  2. J. Aislinn Bohren
Keyword
  1. Information Aggregation
  2. Committees
  3. Deliberation
  4. Collusion
License CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. Games and Economic Behavior
Publication Date November 1, 2019
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.006
Deposited June 21, 2024

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  • Added AliBohren.pdf
  • Added Creator S. Nageeb Ali
  • Added Creator J. Aislinn Bohren
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  • Updated Keyword Show Changes
    Keyword
    • Information Aggregation, Committees, Deliberation, Collusion