Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections

We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails, and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is voluntary and costly, we show that turnout adjusts endogenously so that the outcome of a large election is always first-best.

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Work Title Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
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Open Access
Creators
  1. Vijay Krishna
  2. John Morgan
License CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. The Journal of Political Economy
Publication Date April 2011
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. https://doi.org/10.1086/660731
Deposited February 02, 2022

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Version 1
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  • Created
  • Added Creator Vijay Krishna
  • Added Creator John Morgan
  • Added Krishna and Morgan JPE (2011).pdf
  • Updated License Show Changes
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    • https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
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Version 2
published

  • Created
  • Updated Publisher Show Changes
    Publisher
    • Journal of Political Economy
  • Updated License Show Changes
    License
    • https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
    • https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
  • Published
  • Updated Publisher, Publisher Identifier (DOI), Publication Date Show Changes
    Publisher
    • Journal of Political Economy
    • The Journal of Political Economy
    Publisher Identifier (DOI)
    • https://doi.org/10.1086/660731
    Publication Date
    • 2011
    • 2011-04