Evaluating Excuses: How the Public Judges Noncompliance
Public officials often make policy but delegate its implementation. Yet, for reasons ranging from intransigence to incompetence, those tasked with implementation may not faithfully implement policies. If implementors can frame noncompliance in a way that engenders sympathy, they may be able to disrupt the policymaking process with limited public backlash. We examine if the public's willingness to excuse noncompliance varies with the implementing actor's stated rationale for its failing to carry out the policy. Drawing on a survey experiment fielded in Germany, we find that the public is more sympathetic to resource-based, rather than principled, justifications for noncompliance, though the size of the effect is small. Further, contrary to fears that the pandemic would decay democratic functioning by leading citizens to be more forgiving of emergency-based inaction, we find no evidence that the public is more accepting of noncompliance justified on the base of the pandemic.
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Work Title | Evaluating Excuses: How the Public Judges Noncompliance |
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Subtitle | How the Public Judges Noncompliance |
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License | In Copyright (Rights Reserved) |
Work Type | Article |
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Publication Date | November 28, 2023 |
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Deposited | September 16, 2024 |
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