Media attention and the demise of agency independence: Evidence from a mass administrative reorganization in britain

When administrative agencies are terminated, do they quietly fade from public view? On the one hand, the terminated agencies may have weak issue networks and agency reputations, allowing them to lose public salience. On the other, strong issue networks and agency reputations may mean that termination increases attention to the agencies, making the government pay the cost of public attention generated by the actors within the issue networks. We assess these competing claims by using a unique dataset from a recent mass reorganization of independent agencies in Britain as well as data capturing media attention to agencies in major national newspapers. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the agencies subject to termination experience reductions in the amount of media coverage in major newspapers, disappearing from public view during the post-decision reform period.

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [MEDIA ATTENTION AND THE DEMISE OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE: EVIDENCE FROM A MASS ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION IN BRITAIN. Public Administration 93, 4 p1168-1183 (2015)], which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12190. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions: https://authorservices.wiley.com/author-resources/Journal-Authors/licensing/self-archiving.html#3.

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Work Title Media attention and the demise of agency independence: Evidence from a mass administrative reorganization in britain
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Open Access
Creators
  1. Anthony M. Bertelli
  2. J. Andrew Sinclair
  3. Haram Lee
License In Copyright (Rights Reserved)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. Public Administration
Publication Date July 16, 2015
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12190
Deposited November 11, 2023

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