
Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.
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Work Title | Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders |
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Creators |
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License | CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial) |
Work Type | Article |
Publisher |
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Publication Date | 2001 |
Deposited | June 06, 2022 |
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