Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders

A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.

Files

Metadata

Work Title Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
Access
Open Access
Creators
  1. Jean-Pierre Benoit
  2. Vijay Krishna
License CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. Review of Economic Studies
Publication Date 2001
Deposited June 06, 2022

Versions

Analytics

Collections

This resource is currently not in any collection.

Work History

Version 1
published

  • Created
  • Updated
  • Updated
  • Added Creator Jean-Pierre Benoit
  • Added Creator Vijay Krishna
  • Added Benoit and Krishna RES (2001).pdf
  • Updated License Show Changes
    License
    • https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
  • Published

Version 2
published

  • Created
  • Updated License Show Changes
    License
    • https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
    • https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
  • Published

Version 3
published

  • Created
  • Updated Publisher Show Changes
    Publisher
    • Review of Economic Studies
  • Published

Version 4
published

  • Created
  • Updated Work Title Show Changes
    Work Title
    • Multiple Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
    • Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
  • Published