Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining

We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the n-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," ϱ. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (a) small values of ϱ; and (b) large values of ϱ. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of ϱ is provided.

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Work Title Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining
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Creators
  1. Vijay Krishna
  2. Roberto Serrano
License CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial)
Work Type Article
Publisher
  1. International Journal of Game Theory
Publication Date September 1995
Publisher Identifier (DOI)
  1. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01243155
Deposited August 06, 2022

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    Work Title
    • Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining
    • Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining
    Publisher Identifier (DOI)
    • https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01243155
    Description
    • We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the n-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," \rho. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (a) small values of \rho; and (b) large values of \rho. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of \rho is provided.
    • We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the n-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," ϱ. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (a) small values of ϱ; and (b) large values of ϱ. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of ϱ is provided.
    Publication Date
    • 1995
    • 1995-09