Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining
We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the n-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," \rho. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (a) small values of \rho; and (b) large values of \rho. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of \rho is provided.
|Work Title||Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining|
|License||CC BY-NC 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial)|
|Deposited||August 06, 2022|
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