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“‘Their Deeds are the Deeds of Zimri; but They Expect a Reward Like Phineas’: Neoliberal and Multicultural Discourses in the Development of Israeli DTT Policy

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We examine how neoliberal and multicultural discourses were employed in the development of digital terrestrial television (DTT) policy in Israel as a case study of the deployment of media technology in a society that is characterized by deep social cleavages and rapid neoliberalization. We conduct a detailed analysis of official documents published over 6 years, including preparatory work, draft bills, parliamentary committee minutes, parliamentary plenary discussions, and the wording of the law enacted in February 2008. This study highlights how neoliberal multiculturalism operates as rhetoric that champions the cultural and economic rights of minorities, while masking policy stances that negate these rights. We demonstrate how this is linked to the composition of the channels eventually included on the DTT platform.

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The transition to digital terrestrial television (DTT) broadcasting has been taking place worldwide since the mid-1990s. The technology enables the transmission of more channels than analog technology on a given portion of the spectrum. Picture quality is usually better, and the signal can include an Electronic Program Guide (EPG) and can also be encrypted. As Picard (2007) notes, more than in many other areas of broadcast regulation, the transition to digital television has taken on different formats in different countries and has been subject to very little, if any, transnational coordination of policy.

In this study, we examine the forces that have shaped the development of DTT policy in Israel. We consider the discursive role of neoliberalism and multiculturalism, the emergence of a “neoliberal-multicultural” discourse, and the structural role of clientelism in shaping this policy domain. We do so based on a detailed analysis of official documents published over 6 years, which include preparatory work, draft

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bills, Knesset committee minutes, Knesset plenary discussions, and the wording of the eventual law, which was enacted in February 2008. We argue that the uses of neoliberalism and the abuses of multicultural discourse through clientelist networks culminate in a DTT policy that misses an opportunity to enable television to play a progressive role in restructuring the Israeli public sphere. We thus aim to make a contribution to the understanding of the paradoxical role neoliberal discourses play in media policy debates. This study is the first analysis of DTT policy in Israel. It adds to a growing critical-historical literature on the transitions in Israeli media, which have been published in recent years and have focused mostly on existing electronic media—namely, analog television and radio (i.e., Schejter, 2009; Caspi & Limor, 1999; Liebes, 2003; Yuran, 2001).

We begin with a historical background of Israeli society and continue with a brief discussion of neoliberalism, multiculturalism, and clientelism. Following a brief description of the Israeli media scene and the context of transition to DTT, we present an analysis of the policy process and a theoretical discussion of that process.

**Historical background: Israel and Israeli society**

Israel is a parliamentary democracy carved in 1948 out of the former British colony of Palestine. Its social fabric is a display of two parallel yet distinct social rifts: among Jews, and between Jews and Arabs. During the 1950s, a Jewish population of only 600,000, mostly of European (“Ashkenazi”) descent, absorbed more than 1 million Jewish immigrants, mainly from North Africa and Iraq (“Mizrahi”); in the 1990s, more than 1 million predominantly Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet republics found their way to Israel; and, in between, waves of Jewish immigration from scores of nations made Israel their new home. Immigrant absorption was guided in the state’s formative years by a “Jewish melting pot” model, but in the latter decades of the 20th century this model gradually lost its authority as the state has become home to “different dreams and often opposing aspirations” among its Jewish majority (Zameret, 2002, p. 156), serving as the backdrop for much of the social tension among Jewish Israelis over the years.

As an outcome of wars that took place in 1948 and 1967, Israel dominates a large Arab minority. It is indisputable that the Arab citizens of Israel, many of whom have assumed a Palestinian identity and align themselves with a yet-to-be-formed Arab state, which was also envisioned in 1948, are economically and socially removed from positions of power in Israeli society and are systematically discriminated against (Hasson & Karayanni, 2006).

Since its foundation, the Israeli political economy has undergone significant transformations. Following the 1967 war, it developed a military–industrial complex, which later morphed into a flourishing civil technology sector (Swirski, 2005), changing it from a “developing country to [a] post industrial country” (Sharkansky, 1987). These social rifts on the one hand and ideological transformations on the other have allowed for the development of a policy discourse rooted in three themes: neoliberalism, multiculturalism, and clientelism.
The theoretical framework

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a political-economic ideology that has been deployed to varying degrees in many developed economies from the 1980s onwards. It suggests that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2; see also Clarke, 2004; Frow, 1999). Government, according to this approach, has an important role in shaping and enforcing the regulations needed to safeguard private property, commercial markets, and free trade but should shy away from participating in the market directly and step aside from the provision of social services. Markets rather than governments are presented as the purest expression of popular will (Frank, 2000).

Israeli policymakers too have adopted a neoliberal agenda and argued for a move away from statist intervention toward more reliance on market forces (Ben Bassat, 2002). This transition from a social democratic state to a neoliberal nationalistic state is characterized by a new form of centralization that is dictated by wealthy individuals and corporations and is designed to benefit them and the state equally while excluding a large proportion of the population (see, e.g., Aronoff, 2001; Nitzan & Bichler, 2007; Yuran, 2003). In the telecommunications sector this change was reflected by a weakening of the national public broadcaster; by the corporatization and eventual privatization of the national telecommunications provider, Bezeq, and the introduction of privately owned mobile and fixed telephony providers; by the launch of commercial television in 1993, with a second channel added in 2002; and by the licensing of multichannel cable and satellite television in 1989 and 1999, respectively.

Neoliberalism is also characterized by a disjuncture between the rhetorical championing of governmental minimalism and the reality of continuous governmental intervention to selectively protect certain rights for certain corporate actors, presenting their protected right as reflective of “natural” economic law (Shenhav, 2006). This ideological aspect will be further demonstrated in the analysis of DTT policy that follows.

Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism as an intellectual approach can be seen as a reaction to the monocultural politics evident throughout the history of modern Western societies. Monoculturalism attempted to universalize one particular culture (often Western and middle class), through education and cultural policies, while denying that cultural creations produced by others count as “real” culture (Goldberg, 1994). In reaction to early attempts at challenging monoculturalism, evident in the 1960s in the civil rights movement in the United States and in the student movements in America and Europe, integrative policies were instituted that allowed social groups
to retain their particular culture as minorities on the margins. However, full-fledged multiculturalism requires the provision of egalitarian expressive opportunities for all relevant cultures active in a defined social domain, and demands not just tolerance of “other” cultures by one hegemonic culture, but rather policies that enable the flourishing of all cultures in constant dialogue with one another (Goldberg, 1994). This approach is based on the assumption that an internal sense of identity and belonging coupled with external recognition contributes to one’s well-being (Taylor, 1994; Yona, 2005).

Although Israeli society is culturally heterogeneous, Israeli social policies did not promote multiculturalism, historically. Instead, the multiple groups that make up Israeli society are integrated into a “stratified citizenship regime” (Shafir & Peled, 2002; Yona, 2005), where the “minoritiness” (Schejter et al., 2007) of the various groups is variable. The status of these minorities is pegged to an ethno-republican ideal. Rights are apportioned by the state based on one’s ethnic identity and active contribution to the Israeli polity (two factors that are interdependent). Thus, Jews receive de facto more rights than Arab citizens of Israel, and Ashkenazi Jews more than Mizrahi Jews. This has led observers to classify Israel as an ethnic democracy (Smooha, 1997) or as a flawed “Ethnic Constitutional Order” (Peleg, 2007, p. 47). In the past few decades, group identities have gained in importance culturally and politically although reciprocally negating one another, further undermining the prospects for intergroup dialogue (Mautner, Sagi, & Shamir, 1998).

Clientelism

In addition to the discourses of multiculturalism and neoliberalism, the changing structure of the Israeli political system, in which these discourses are embedded, should also be taken into account in the form of increasing clientelism. “Clientelism and patronage are strategies for the acquisition, maintenance, and aggrandizement of political power, on the part of patrons, and strategies for the protection and promotion of their interests, on the part of the clients” (Piattoni, 2001, p. 2). They are exchange systems where voters exchange political support for various outputs of the public decision-making process. In a clientelistic system, the key predictor of a policy outcome is its political feasibility rather than any recourse to more abstract political principles. Clientelist media systems have been characterized, among other things, by the instrumentalization of private media for political ends and by the politicization of broadcast regulation (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002). The importance of clientelism in Israel has been rising against the background of a splintering party system (Peri, 2004). Slightly more than 12 parties had been elected on average to each Knesset between 1949 and 2006, and at the time of each Knesset’s end of term there were on average 14 ½ parties and often—in eight instances—additional individual one-member parties, all as a result of party restructuring during the sitting Knesset’s term (Schejter & Yemini, 2009). Since the 1980s, more parties representing sectoral-ethnic concerns and embodying a patron–client relationship—at first Mizrahi Jews and Arabs and since the 1990s former Soviet Jews and explicitly secular Jews—have
entered the stage replacing both right- and left-wing ideological parties in their importance for coalition building. These developments have been expressed in the media policy domain, in particular with regard to multichannel platforms, where “under the guise of advancing ‘muticulturalism,’ [cable] policy has in fact aimed to promote segregation . . . serving the need of specific audiences who have gained political power . . . to maintain their separate group identity . . . [and] . . . preserve the division between Arab and Jewish societies” (Schejter, 1999, p. 178).

The structural attributes of a clientelistic system are highly compatible with both neoliberal and multicultural ideologies. With respect to neoliberalism, the close partnership between business elites and politicians as well as civil servants which is central to neoliberalism and is expressed in the frequent exchange of money, ideas, and people (the latter in the form of a revolving occupational door between the public and private spheres) is a capitalistic expression of the classic patron–client relationship. As for multiculturalism, its focus on the rights of subsections of a society can be easily and selectively employed by political elites wishing to attract support from specific ethnic or religious groups by championing the rights of particular groups for greater representation and power. We stress the structural role of clientelism because it constitutes the context in which neoliberalism and multiculturalism are “embedded” (see Granovetter, 1985 on embeddedness), and the medium through which they are expressed.

**Historical background—The Israeli television environment**

**The television platforms**

Television has played an important role in Israel’s social and cultural history. During the first 25 years of Israeli television only one channel existed, and television became the central medium for news and information (Katz, Haas, & Gurevitch, 1997). Television was also a central force in promoting national unity. The nightly 9 p.m. news magazine “became a sort of civic ritual during which the society communed with itself” (p. 5). The Israeli demand for television was neither satisfied by the one-channel black-and-white service fare, nor by videocassette recorders. Despite relatively high prices, a vertically integrated system, and no premium service, Israelis rapidly adopted cable television once it became an option in the early 1990s (Schejter & Lee, 2007). The introduction of a first commercial channel in 1993, a second in 2002, a digital direct-to-home satellite service in 1999, and the digitization of the cable system in the early 2000s further transformed the Israeli media space by providing many more channels.

The Israeli Broadcasting Authority (IBA) is charged with national broadcasting of television funded by a license fee. IBA television broadcasts over two channels: Channel 1 is terrestrial and Channel 33 broadcasts by satellite. The Second Authority oversees commercial television; as of 2010 there are two commercial television channels (Channel 2 and Channel 10). Although Channels 1, 2, and 10 are officially terrestrial channels, due to spectrum scarcity that limits their reach, and in order
to ensure universal service, they were also carried over an unencrypted satellite signal since the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{1} Cable and satellite television are both governed by the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Council (CSBC). The IBA and the Second Authority are independent regulators, whereas the CSBC operates from within the Ministry of Communications (MOC). Electronic media regulation in Israel is characterized by detailed cultural obligations. This applies to broadcast, cable, and satellite (Schejter, 2009).

The multichannel offering: Designated and government channels

Between the launch of cable in the late 1980s and the early 2000s, all regional cable operators converged into one, and the arrival of the Direct-Broadcast Satellite (DBS) operator in 1999 created a de facto multichannel television duopoly. Both platforms offer a plethora of channels, including the national IBA and Second Authority regulated over-the-air channels, designated as “must carry”; locally packaged channels; and retransmitted foreign networks. One-sixth of the capacity of the cable network was awarded to the state in the original cable law in 1986, and it was authorized to decide how to use it. The state first exercised this right when it put out to tender a home shopping channel in 1995; however, in 1997 a new entity—designated channels—was created. These were to be “special-interest channels” licensed by the government according to its priorities on its one-sixth share of the cable system. The law was designed to create specialized channels for certain minority groups. In order to maintain each channel’s distinct nature and ensure it would not compete with the generalist commercial channels, the law specified that if the “special interest” was linguistic, the channels must carry most of their programs and all of their advertising in the language on which the channel is based. Thus, the law created de facto “cultural ghettos” (Schejter, 2009).

The precursor of the process that led to the creation of the designated channels was a plan initiated by the labor-led Yitzhak Rabin government in 1995 to provide for a channel in Arabic that would serve the Palestinian-Israeli minority. However, the subsequent rise to power of the Likud-led government in 1996 led the Broadcasting Regulation Authority (BRA), which was established to implement the policy, to put the Arabic channel last on its list of designated channels. What emerged as the first “designated language” channel to be established was a channel in Russian serving former Soviet immigrants. Later, an Israeli music channel was also launched. Both are designed to serve the dominant Jewish culture and the interests of the state (Schejter, 2005; Schejter & Elavsky, 2009).

Attempts to launch a designated channel in Arabic failed. An amendment to the Telecommunications Law legislated in 2001 authorized the Minister of Communications to allow the “designated channel in Arabic” to be broadcast as an unencrypted satellite channel as well in order to ensure maximum audience access. It also states that within 2 years of its launch, the channel will pass from the jurisdiction of the CSBC to that of the Second Authority and be regulated as a commercial-terrestrial channel even though it will be distributed by satellite. However, even
these measures did not lead to the creation of a channel serving the Arabic-speaking Palestinian-Israeli community (Schejter, 2008) as of 2010.

One more type of television broadcasting operating in Israel since 1966 is government-run educational broadcasting. It is allotted time over IBA’s Channel 1, commercial Channel 2, and one cable channel, which is a “must carry” on both cable and satellite platforms (“Channel 23”). In addition, The Knesset operates the “Knesset Channel,” which is a “must carry” on both cable and satellite platforms. (see Table 1 for a summary of Israeli television offerings, regulatory agencies, and main funding sources.)

Methodology

Media reflect a control system that is founded on the basic assumptions and beliefs a society upholds (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). However, the critical legal methodology (Kelman, 1990) utilized in this study exposes distortions in the political system that created the legal texts, by penetrating the “ideological curtain” that wraps the text (Swirski, 1993). By systematically analyzing the legal documentation relevant to a particular issue, the identification of motivations that may be legitimate within a specific social order (at least formally), but whose formal justification obscures their real political importance in serving a dominant ideology, is possible (Cotterell, 1992, p. 212).

In this study all published versions of drafts of the DTT law, as well as all published documents of Knesset debates on the topic and all published reports created by regulatory authorities, were analyzed. They were found on the relevant online databases, some of which are public and some of which are proprietary and require subscription. Every reference to the question of channel selection was identified and eventually described herein. These references were then analyzed for the existence of multicultural, neoliberal, or clientelistic elements. The references made to the ethnic/clientelist background of the Knesset members cited were based on their official biographies as published by the Knesset on its website.

Chronological analysis of the development of DTT policy in Israel

Preliminary efforts: DTT and cable/satellite tiering

The development of DTT policy in Israel is closely tied to the policy discussions regarding the cable and satellite offering, in particular, the policy debate surrounding the enforcement of “tiering,” which was supposed to grant the viewing public the ability to choose between different channel packages and force cable and satellite operators to offer a “basic service” of “must carry” channels. In April 2001, the CSBC began drawing up regulations for introducing such a tiered service. In the basic cable tier, the CSBC recommended to include IBA’s broadcasts (Channel 1 and satellite Channel 33); Educational Television’s “Channel 23”; over-the-air commercial Channels 2 and 10 (the latter of which was not yet created); the
Table 1 Israeli Television Offerings Considered for Inclusion in DTT Package—Channels, Content, Regulators, Funding, and Distribution Before DTT Transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel number</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Regulator</th>
<th>Main funding source</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>State/Public terrestrial broadcasting (general)</td>
<td>Israeli Broadcasting Authority (IBA)</td>
<td>License fee</td>
<td>Analog terrestrial, unencrypted satellite, must carry on cable and satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Commercial terrestrial broadcasting (general)</td>
<td>Second Authority</td>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Designated channel (general, Russian language)</td>
<td>CSBC</td>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>Must carry on cable and satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Commercial “terrestrial” broadcasting (general)</td>
<td>Second Authority</td>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>Unencrypted on satellite, must carry on cable and satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Educational (education, news entertainment)</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Budgetary allocation</td>
<td>Must carry on cable and satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Designated channel (Hebrew music channel)</td>
<td>CSBC</td>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>State/Public terrestrial broadcasting (general), Purportedly serving Arab-speaking population</td>
<td>IBA</td>
<td>License fee</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>State/Public (Knesset channel)</td>
<td>Knesset</td>
<td>Budgetary allocation</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. An Arab language designated channel was planned but never launched. CSBC = Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Council; DTT = digital terrestrial television.
“designated channels”; the home shopping network; community channels (although those did not fully exist at the time); and an EPG. The Council presented similar recommendations about the satellite platform in August 2002. By then, two more channels that had been established in the meantime were added to the basic tier: the Knesset channel and the IBA’s Middle East channel, a propaganda channel that targeted neighboring states (which eventually merged with Channel 33).

The limited over-the-air offering in the Israeli media market, and the prominence of the multichannel operators in Israeli homes, may have been the reason for the delayed regulatory attention to DTT; however, concomitant to the introduction of the tiering debate, the potential for DTT to create a platform-independent “basic” package surfaced. DTT was first introduced to the Israeli policy discourse by the “Committee on Extending and Reforming of Broadcasting Choice” (a.k.a. “The Peled Committee”) formed by the Likud government in 1996 and charged with transitioning the Israeli media landscape to one that is “based on free, equal and fair competition.” (Nissan, 1997, p. 15). The committee recommended a transition to DTT and a shutdown of analog broadcasting within 5–8 years (p. 52). This recommendation, alongside a plethora of other revolutionary ideas, however, was put on the back burner, and the next signs of regulatory interest in the adoption of DTT in Israel did not appear until 2002. In a working paper submitted by the chairwoman of the CSBC to the Minister of Communications (Inbar, 2002), the CSBC framed the transition to DTT around the world as a failure (p. 15). In assessing the potential of the technology in Israel, the report stressed the fact that both multichannel operators in Israel were in economic difficulties since the introduction of competition between them, 3 years earlier, and concluded that “perhaps the advantages seen as emanating from this product are not true advantages in the circumstances existing in the local market.” (Inbar, 2002, p. 10) Nonetheless, in August 2004, the government decided (Decision No. 2449) to form an interministerial committee to study the switch to digital format by March of 2006 stating the goal of “economic efficiency” as the overriding consideration. Exactly one year later, the government decided to begin the practical steps aimed at ensuring DTT service by January 1, 2007 and cessation of analog service by December 31, 2008.

While the government was taking steps to initiate DTT, some parallel regulatory activities were taking place with regard to creating the basic tier over cable and satellite. In the omnibus bill attached to the budget proposal in the middle of 2006, the government proposed an amendment to the Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasting) Law, which would force both operators to offer a “basic broadcasting basket” to subscribers. This “basket” was to include three types of channels: IBA’s and the Second Authority’s over-the-air channels; the government’s “educational television”; and the designated channels (at the time, the Russian-language and music channels).

In the meantime, as a step in the DTT transition, the Second Authority decided, as a cost-cutting measure, to cease the analog distribution of Channel 2 over satellite in October 2006 despite consumer groups and some Knesset members arguing that
those relying on the satellite signal were mostly disadvantaged households, many from the Palestinian minority.

**Economics Committee debates: DTT package composition**

As mid-2007 arrived and the transition to DTT decided upon by the government seemed to be stalling, the Knesset Economics Committee, in its capacity of oversight over the MOC, held a hearing under the heading “free television broadcasts” (Knesset Records, July 11, 2007). The three positions that developed in the hearing framed the regulatory debate from that moment on. The government representatives explained that the process is driven by economic considerations; the cable and satellite operators claimed DTT will unfairly compete with their services; and committee members raised two concerns: an economic concern that the difference between the content of the cable/satellite “basic tier” and the DTT offering can potentially deal an economic blow to the designated channels, and a cultural concern regarding the important role of the designated channels in the lives of the minority groups they purportedly serve and the cultural cost to these communities as a result of not being offered access to these channels over DTT, which unlike cable/satellite is free. The latter focused on the Russian-language channel and its perceived audience as in reality it was the only designated channel in existence serving a cultural minority. Indeed, one member of Knesset explicitly associated this difference in the offering with the needs of Russian-speaking immigrants, whereas another, advocating the inclusion of the Russian channel, added that “some say that Arabic is not less important . . . I am talking of large populations when each one consists of about 20 percent of the Israeli population.” At the same time, the IBA representative to the discussion stated that the public broadcaster sees DTT as an opportunity to inaugurate a new channel, based on the Channel 33 platform, that will be in Arabic and will provide quality service to the Arabic-speaking population.

The government decision alone, however, could not move the process any further; thus in October 2007 it resorted to legislation. In the omnibus bill attached to the 2008 proposed budget, the government proposed charging the Second Authority with erecting by December 1, 2008, a digital broadcasting facility that would serve the broadcasting of the commercial channels under its jurisdiction (2 and 10), the channels of the IBA (1 and 33), and the “Knesset Channel.” The explanatory memorandum appended to the draft law provides only economic justification to the transition and does not explain the choice of the channels, two of which (33 and “Knesset”) are not over-the-air entities. In January 2008, before the omnibus bill was brought to a vote, the chairman of the Knesset Economics Committee published his own version for the digital offering. His draft proposal adds three more channels to the government’s bill: the educational television “Channel 23” and the two existing designated channels, the Russian language and the Israeli music channel. The draft does not mention the “designated channels” as the entity to be retransmitted (which would imply the inclusion of an Arabic language channel as well, at least in principle),
but specifically spells out the Russian-language and the music channels, as does the short explanatory memorandum.

Maintaining the discussion in an economic framework was the gist of a report submitted to the Knesset Economics Committee by the Knesset’s research arm on the eve of a series of hearings scheduled for January of 2008 (Tikva, 2008). The report stressed the contribution of the transition for the development of competition in the electronic media market. It demonstrated how a subsidy on digital converters for all 450,000 households not subscribed to multichannel television services would pay itself back within 4 years. The report stated that additional channels could perhaps be added in the future to the five proposed channels but only after a feasibility study.

The Knesset Economics Committee convened four times during January 2008 to discuss the different proposals (Knesset committee records, January 7, 15, 23, and 29, 2008). In the first meeting the committee’s chair introduced the law as a “social law” with “immense social benefits,” as it offers significant savings for lower income populations and enables their reception of a limited multichannel service. In addition, he stressed, the law advances Israel technologically and is environmentally friendly. The government’s representative presented the transition as purely economic, and stressed that it was designed to maintain the status quo with regard to over-the-air channels. This of course was inherently untrue, as both Channel 33 and the Knesset Channel were available only over cable and satellite, and Channel 10, although officially an over-the-air channel, was in fact distributed by satellite. It is significant to note that the same government representative presented both facts (that this is a move preserving the status quo and that this is not the status quo); however, Knesset members were not alarmed by this contradiction. Indeed, as the debate progressed the government maintained the economic focus of the policy change and coated its objection to any change in the channel offering by the need to respect commitments made to both the cable and satellite operators and to those who competed for the designated channel licenses.

Economic and legal considerations notwithstanding, what alarmed the Knesset members was the proposed list of channels. A nonmember of the committee, a self-described “representative of the Russian-speaking public,” stated that she had come especially to take part in that debate because she believed that not adding the Russian-language designated channel to the DTT offering hurts this public. The chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee stated that the lessons of silencing the culture of immigrants were that this policy was wrong as it “disconnected [the immigrants’ children] from the tradition, language, culture, mentality . . . a clear break between the young generation and their elder parents.” How can you dub this committee a “consumer-oriented committee,” he stated, when the whole debate is about technology and economics? Instead of adjusting the service to the public, he exclaimed, we are trying to adjust the public to the service. Low-income families are prevalent among Russian- and Arabic-speaking populations, he added, and as IBA’s Channel 33 has the potential of serving the Arabic-speaking population, he
demanded adding the Russian-speaking channel to the package. The sentiment was echoed by additional members of the Knesset present, and the analogy between the Russian-speaking and Arabic-speaking populations was reiterated; however, it is important to stress that the plight of the Russian-speakers was the dominant theme, with the needs of the Arabic-speaking often added as an afterthought and only in a minority of the statements.

The only direct reference to the needs of the Palestinian-Israeli population was raised by a representative of the nonprofit group “Mossawa,” (“equality”). In his testimony, the speaker questioned the commitment of regulators, platform operators, and broadcasters to the needs of the “Arab population.” He stated that this population has basically been ignored with regard to basic services as well as with receiving a fair share of government funding for local television production. However, none of his comments received any response from either attending Knesset members, government officials, regulators, or stakeholders.

Nonpartisan public bodies also participated in the debate. The chief executive of the consumer council (CC), a statutory government corporation, stated in his testimony that what is at stake is the “constitutional right for information,” which should be available for the “tax paying public” as a whole in “an open and free manner.” At the same time, the CEO argued that information “should be available also to the public in an egalitarian form, and Israel as a country in gathering its exiles has publics who speak other languages. Until we become a melting pot . . . these publics . . . have the right for the same constitutional right for information, and they do not get served in the existing proposition.”

Following the previous hearing, the same MK (Member of Knesset) self-described as representing the Russian-speaking population uttered in reaction to the government’s support for a narrow DTT package excluding the Russian-speaking channel: “so without Russians and Arabs.” She later added that, “all the deals are at the expense of Russian speakers” and announced that, “the Russian speaking faction within Kadima [at the time the ruling party] is against the law and against the government’s decision.” Indeed, Knesset members who all immigrated as teenagers to Israel in the 1980s and 1990s were those who spearheaded the debate regarding the inclusion of the Russian-language channel on the DTT platform.

Following the final write-up of the law in committee, the committee reconvened for the fourth time to vote on revisions for the draft under a governmental “threat” to rescind the law if any aspect of it were to be changed. The revision offered was to include in the DTT platform the Russian-language and music channels, as well as “an Arabic-language designated channel whenever it’s erected.” Members were “torn” between voting for the erection of a new “partial” service and voting for a more “full” service, risking that the whole transition will be put on hold should the government’s threat materialize. The self-described “Russian faction” reframed its offered revisions in the context of a cultural divide. Among them, the chairman of the Finance Committee stated that “you need to refer to those who don’t speak a language and not to try and teach them that they need to know Hebrew and not Russian.”
This raised the objection of the Economics Committee chair who exclaimed, “[w]hy are you saying that? Did anyone here say we want to teach them a language?” The revision, however, was rejected by vote.

**Legislative endgame**

On February 4, 2008, the law was voted upon on the Knesset floor (Knesset Records, February 4, 2008). In presenting the law, the Economics Committee chair stated:

...no doubt each and every one of us would have wanted that more channels will be distributed freely to the public, of course also channel 9 [the Russian language], channel 24 [music], channel 23, the community channel and the academic channel. I myself proposed a bill that deals with adding channels 9 and 24.

The chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee, himself a member of the Russian immigrant constitutency, presented his revisions to the draft and stated:

...I am astonished by this massive mobilization at a late hour in order to remove revisions offered by some Knesset members to include a few more channels that are aimed to assist a needy population in this package. And not only a needy population socio-economically, but a population whose mother tongue—what can we do—is not Hebrew; their mother tongue is Russian... we are all for immigration, we talk about the State of Israel as an immigrant absorbing country, but when we speak individually on a new immigrant that needs to understand television programs in his mother’s tongue, for some reason we are against it.

His sentiment was reiterated by other members of the “Russian contingency.” One numbered the affected population as 300,000 people who “can’t learn Hebrew because of different kinds of limitations, because they are elderly, because they are old. And you expect them of all people to pay for cable [television] and hold them hostage.” Another estimated the affected population at 1.5 million for whom the designated channel is the main and most important channel. Even if the State of Israel wants to deliver emergency messages, this is the only channel to reach them through and to provide information to populations that do not speak Hebrew, and may not learn to speak it until the end of their lives.

A third reframed the law as one intended to help needy populations avoid paying for “the whole package” (referring to cable and satellite) and added,

...are the interests of Hot and Yes [the cable and satellite operators] more important than the situation of such a needy population that will see in this decision a slap on the face that will be hard to accept?

The revisions, however, were turned down and the law passed by a huge margin (see Table 2 for the different channel offering proposals). The Economics Committee chairman thanked the people involved in drafting the “important social law” and
Table 2  Suggested Composition of DTT Package in the Different Proposals, Drafts, and Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>IBA Channels 1, 33, and commercial Channels 2, 10</th>
<th>Knesset channel</th>
<th>Arabic channel</th>
<th>Russian channel</th>
<th>Music channel</th>
<th>Educational TV channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government position in Economics Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(July 11, 2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government omnibus bill</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(October, 2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Committee chairman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(January 2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Committee chairman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(as 33)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Knesset members in Economics Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final law</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DTT = digital terrestrial television.

committed to pass his own amendment to include the Russian-language, music, and educational channel in the DTT offering in the near future. While his draft proposal was already submitted to the Knesset, a month later an additional draft proposal was offered by 10 members of the Knesset of the then ruling Kadima party offering to add all designated channels to the DTT.9 None of these amendments have become law as of yet.

Discussion: Neoliberal multiculturalism discourse dominates process

In considering the role multicultural and neoliberal discourses as well as the clientelist political structure played in shaping the legislative process, we argue that the dominant discourse in this legislative process is a neoliberal one reducing the DTT service to a product, the environment in which it would be deployed to a market and the recipients of the service to consumers. This is evident from the outset in the CSBC’s fear that DTT would bring about the incumbents’ (cable and satellite operators) collapse (Landau, 2002, June 16). This led it to publish the tepid report in 2002 regarding the utility of such a “product” thereby setting the tone for a lethargic
Neoliberal multiculturalism

The contradictions inherent in neoliberalism—a discourse that champions minimal government while in reality promotes continuous government intervention to selectively protect corporate and state interests—received its fullest expression in a number of instances. As noted above, the government fought tooth and nail to prevent the inclusion of additional channels in order to protect the “status-quo” regarding over-the-air channels. However, it supported the inclusion of two state-affiliated channels that had never been “free” channels. Thus, it was not really protecting the status quo, but rather protecting a position favored by corporate stakeholders while under the guise of providing a public service adding to the package services that serve the government interest. In addition, there was a tone of resignation in the Economics Committee chair’s words—“no doubt each and every one of us would have wanted that more channels will be distributed freely to the public” [our stress]. This illustrates how economic interests are selectively naturalized and presented as an irresistible force of nature that cannot be opposed while rhetorically suggesting that a populist desire did exist for the inclusion of additional channels. As Filc (2006) has suggested, Israeli neoliberalism has a populist tone. Here, a fervent populist wish for the “flowering” of a thousand channels shared by “everyone” comes against the hard economic “reality” of the impossibility of their inclusion. We see here an Israeli version of American market populism (Frank, 2000) that posits the market as the most transparent expression of the public’s interest. Moreover, the Economics Committee chairman introduced both in a draft proposal and in his speech the need to add the Russian and the music channel, instead of referring in general to the “designated channels.” This focus demonstrates that the interest being promoted is the economic interest of the existing channels and not the “multicultural” interest of the designated channel endeavor.

The DTT case is therefore a clear case where a new form of neoliberal discourse is evident, a discourse of “neoliberal multiculturalism.” “Neoliberal multiculturalism” is a rhetoric that champions the cultural and economic rights of minorities and the disadvantaged while masking a policy stance that negates these very rights by defending corporate interests. Neoliberalism and multiculturalism operate at different units of analysis—the former champions the individual, whereas the latter the group; and the former sees the market as the central arena for human action, whereas the latter assigns that role to culture. It is, therefore, difficult to envision a discourse that merges the two coherently. Hybrids of the two are superficial cultural overtures that mask a regressive material reality as has been the case in development interventions by IGOs in Latin America (Hale, 2005; see also Melamed, 2006). In our case, the Russian channel serving a specific community is selectively championed
Neoliberal and Multicultural Discourses

R. Davidson & A. M. Scheijter

echoing a multicultural logic, only for this to lead according to classic neoliberal logic to the enactment of a law which under the guise of serving the “consumer” fully protects the dominant market actors.

Clientelism

Clientelist motives were extremely prominent in the policy debates we analyzed. Knesset members of Russian extraction argued specifically for the inclusion of a channel serving their specific constituency with pro forma mention of Arabic speakers. Theirs was a particular argument about the needs of a particular group, and not a more general multicultural argument about the need for the DTT package to reflect the heterogeneity of Israeli society and perhaps even serve as an arena for the introduction of new channels that are not merely cultural “ghettos.” Thus, multiculturalism was shaped by clientelism in a way that enabled one Russian-speaking member of Knesset to talk about the harm caused to “my consumer” (Solodkin, Economics Committee, January 28, 2008) by the Russian channel’s exclusion from the DTT package.

As the debate suggests, this clientelist approach heightened intergroup suspicions and made it harder for the “Russian” Knesset members to forge an alliance that might have led to the inclusion of additional channels including a Russian one in the DTT package at launch. One should note that the one Palestinian voice in the committee debates also presented a particularist argument for the inclusion of an Arab channel rather than a more comprehensive multicultural argument for the inclusion of multiple channels.

The committee discussions further illustrate how multicultural principles are subverted under the neoliberal umbrella. Although multiculturalism argues that minorities should mutually recognize each others’ legitimate status, the discussion shows that when an Arab representative presented demands for representation in the DTT package, his argument was totally ignored. This is testimony to the absence of one of the prerequisites of multiculturalism—reciprocal recognition of cultural rights between neighboring groups. Even though the Russian Knesset members often mentioned the Arab-speaking minority in the same breath, masking the clientelism in multiculturalism, that minority’s needs were presented as secondary—“some say that Arabic is not less important.” This form of distancing hardly constitutes a full endorsement of the Arab minority’s linguistic rights.

Finally, the unspoken assumptions implicit in a stratified citizenship regime are evident throughout the debate both in the politicians’ conditional support for the inclusion of an Arabic channel, the attempt of some actors to present a propaganda channel directed at Arab populations in the region as a channel serving the Arab minority, and in the CC’s equation of the public’s information rights with those of the Jewish population only. The differential treatment of Russian-speaking Jews and Arabic-speaking citizens of Israel thus exemplifies the political expediency and clientelist agenda that predominated the debate: The Russian-speaking population consists of immigrants whose ultimate goal under the official “melting pot” policy is
to assimilate in the Hebrew-speaking society, whereas the Arabic-speaking minority is an indigenous community for whom not speaking Hebrew is a choice to express cultural uniqueness. Thus, those among the Russian immigrants who “will never learn the language” are in a socially transitional stage and their representatives’ agenda was thus purely clientelist and rooted in the need to preserve their own political power. The cynical nature of this position is further apparent when one takes into account that a “designated channel” in Arabic had already been granted an “over-the-air” status by the law. Therefore, if any channel “deserves” automatic inclusion in the DTT offering according to the “economic” reasoning for the transition, it should be the Arab language channel. However, within the stratification of political power in the Israeli system as demonstrated in the Knesset debates, this legal certainty was never even mentioned, and was drowned in a cacophony of posturing disguising a clientelist agenda. As Table 3 demonstrates, although many of the central actors cloaked themselves in broader interests, all were promoting narrow policy objectives, and none were considering DTT as a service that would serve the broadest possible number of citizens.

Neoliberal multiculturalism and regressive policy outcomes

Although “neoliberal multiculturalism” has not been used in the analysis of communicative contexts, we would argue that it could be utilized to identify a broad array of phenomena and locate their common ideological and structural sources. Thus, the token use of multiculturalism by American news organizations to conduct minor changes in hiring procedures without committing to real multicultural reform in institutional and reporting terms (Glasser, Awad, & Kim, 2009) can be seen as another communicative instance of “neoliberal multiculturalism.” Future work should consider identifying a fuller set of communicative cases that exhibit elements of neoliberal multiculturalism and encompass additional institutional and geographical arenas. It should further consider how this discourse contributes to regressive institutional outcomes that preserve the power of dominant state and corporate actors, especially in socially cleaved societies.

DTT has been seized upon in some countries (notably Great Britain) as an opportunity to broaden the public sphere (Smith & Steemers, 2007), whereas in others this potential has been circumscribed. Our analysis suggests that neoliberal and “multicultural” discourses were used in the Israeli case to follow the second regressive path. DTT policy discourse is a unique example in which access to the public record has allowed the uncovering of how the promotion of clientelist needs under the banners of neoliberalism and multiculturalism are but a “cover up” for deep government intervention ensuring cultural segregation and the preservation of existing political power blocs, a form of neoliberalism that can be referred to as “neoliberal multiculturalism.” The Hebrew sages have long recognized this type of behavior and criticized the hypocrisy of those asking for a reward for being righteous (like the biblical priest Phineas10) whereas acting in contradiction to the public good (like the philanderer Zimri).
### Table 3: The Key Actors, Their Policy Objectives, and Discursive Stances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Main policy objective</th>
<th>Discursive illustration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cable regulator</strong></td>
<td>Neoliberal: Protecting incumbent multichannel providers</td>
<td>“perhaps the advantages seen as emanating from this <em>product</em> are not true advantages in the circumstances existing in the local <em>market</em>” (Inbar, 2002, p. 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td>Neoliberal: Achieving economic efficiency in terrestrial channel distribution; expanding reach of state channels</td>
<td>“the government decision...discusses the unification of distribution systems in a more <em>efficient</em> manner” (Finance ministry representative, Economics Committee, July 11, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multichannel providers and national commercial broadcast channels</td>
<td>Neoliberal: Protecting dominant market actors by preventing the development of an attractive free alternative to their services and the elevation of designated channels to broadcast status</td>
<td>“it is enough that they add [a channel] for one sector and we have lost the battle. <em>The existing platforms</em> that continue to bleed and provide good service <em>must be given favorable regulation</em>” (Cable provider CEO, Economics Committee, July 11, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Committee Chairman</td>
<td>Neoliberal-multicultural: Offering a more expansive DTT package (serving the Jewish public)</td>
<td>“this proposed law...adds to the list of channels...Channel 23, the <em>Russian</em> channel and the <em>music</em> channel” (explanatory memorandum appended to draft law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Committee Chairman</td>
<td>Clientelist: Including the Russian-speaking channel on the DTT platform</td>
<td>“you need to serve those who don’t speak a language and not try and teach them that they need to know <em>Hebrew</em> and not <em>Russian.</em>” (Finance Committee chairman, Economics Committee, January 28, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-speaking Knesset members</td>
<td>Clientelist: Including the Russian-speaking channel on the DTT platform</td>
<td>“a year ago I contacted the Prime Minister’s office and said that without Channel 9 [in the DTT package] <em>my consumer is hurt</em>” (Russian-speaking Knesset member, Economics Committee, January 15, 2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* The shaded actors were the most successful in articulating their policy objectives in the final legislation. DTT = digital terrestrial television. Text in bold—our emphasis.
Notes

1 Channel 10, in fact, was carried only over the unencrypted satellite signal (in addition to cable and satellite) in anticipation of the DTT transition.

2 The Peled Committee recommended a neoliberal overhaul of the Israeli media landscape. Many of its recommendations were implemented, among them the introduction of DTH (Direct to Home) satellites and the establishment of the “designated channels.” Others, including deregulating the supervision over content in broadcasting, the legislation of a comprehensive communications law, and the establishment of a single telecommunications regulator, are still being debated.


4 Arrangements in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments aimed at Reaching Budgetary and Economic Policy Goals for the 2008 Fiscal Year) Draft Law, Hatzaot Hok 335, 10.15.2007, p. 16.


7 The reference to the “right for information” as a “constitutional right” is questionable as neither the Israeli quasi-constitution nor the courts have ever affirmed such a right.

8 As determined by their biographical statements on the Knesset’s web site www.knesset.gov.il.


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“他们的所为是 Zimri 之所为，但他们却像 Phineas 那样期待奖励”：以色列数码地面电视政策发展中的新自由主义和多元文化的论述

Roei Davidson
以色列海法大学传播系

【摘要】

作为媒介技术在一个分裂严重和新自由主义飞速发展的社会的案例，我们研究新自由主义和多元文化的论述如何被应用到以色列数字地面电视（DTT）政策的发展中。我们对 6 年余所公布的官方文件进行详细地分析，包括筹备工作、草拟法案、议会委员会的会议记录、议会全体会议讨论以及 2008 年 2 月颁布的法律措辞。这项研究突出显示新自由主义的多元文化如何作为一种修辞来支持少数民族的文化和经济权利，同时掩盖否定这些权利的政策立场。我们并论证这些观点与数码地面电视平台的频道最后组成的相关关系。
« Leurs actions sont celles de Zimri, mais ils s’attendent à la récompense de Pinhas » : discours néolibéral et multiculturel dans le développement d’une politique de télévision numérique terrestre en Israël

Nous examinons l’emploi des discours néolibéral et multiculturel dans le développement d’une politique de télévision numérique terrestre (TNT) en Israël, à titre d’étude de cas du déploiement des technologies médiatiques dans une société caractérisée par de profonds clivages sociaux et par une rapide néolibéralisation. Nous menons une analyse détaillée de documents officiels publiés sur une période de plus de six ans, dont des travaux préparatoires, des avant-projets de loi, des procès-verbaux de comités parlementaires, des discussions plénières parlementaires et le libellé de la loi promulguée en février 2008. Cette étude souligne comment le multiculturalisme néolibéral agit en tant que rhétorique qui promeut les droits culturels et économiques des minorités tout en dissimulant des positions politiques qui nient ces droits. Nous démontrons comment ce phénomène est lié à la composition des canaux finalement inclus dans la plateforme TNT.
„Ihre Taten sind die Taten der Simri, aber sie erwarten eine Belohnung wie Phineas“:
Neoliberale und multikulturelle Diskurse im Kontext der Entwicklung von Richtlinien für
das digitale terrestrische Fernsehen in Israel

Roei Davidson

Wir beschäftigen uns mit der Frage, wie neoliberale und multikulturelle Diskurse bei der
Entwicklung der Richtlinien für das digitale terrestrische Fernsehen in Israel verwendet
wurden und diskutieren damit eine Fallstudie für den Einsatz einer Medientechnologie in
einer Gesellschaft, die von tiefen sozialen Gräben und rasanter Neoliberalisierung
gekennzeichnet ist. Wir führten dazu eine detaillierte Analyse der offiziellen Dokumente
über einen Zeitraum von sechs Jahren durch. Diese Dokumente umfassen die
Dokumentation der vorbereitenden Arbeiten genauso wie Gesetzesentwürfe,
Sitzungsberichte des parlamentarischen Komitees, parlamentarische Plenardiskussionen
und den Wortlaut des Gesetzes, das im Februar 2008 in Kraft trat. Die Studie stellt heraus,
wie neoliberaler Multikulturalismus als eine Rhetorik funktioniert, die sich für die
kulturellen und ökonomischen Rechte von Minoritäten einsetzt und gleichzeitig
politische Haltungen verdeckt, die diese Rechte negieren. Wir zeigen auf, wie dieser
Prozess bei der Zusammenstellung der Kanäle eine Rolle spielt, die letztlich auf der
Plattform des digitalen terrestrischen Fernsehens ausgestrahlt werden.
“그들의 행위는 Zimri 의 행위들이지만 그들은 Phineas 처럼 보상을 기대한다.” 이스라엘 DTT 정책의 발전에서 신자유주의적 그리고 다문화적 문화적 담론들

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본 논문은 큰 사회적 격차와 신자유주의에 의해 특징지워지는 사회에서 미디어 기술의 발전에 관한 사례연구로서, 이스라엘의 디지털지상파방송 (DTT)의 발전에 있어 어떻게 신자유주의적 그리고 다문화적 담론들이 사용되었는지를 연구한 것이다. 본 논문은 지난 2008 년 2 월 최종적으로 확정된 법조문과 이에 앞서 6 년간 출간된 공시문건들에 대한 심도있는 분석을 통해 단행되었다. 본 사례연구는 어떻게 신자유주의적 다문화주의가 소수자들의 문화적 그리고 경제적 권리를 지지하는 수사로 작용했는지에 대해 중점을 두었다. 우리는 이러한 내용들이 DTT 플랫폼에서 궁극적으로 포함된 채널들의 형성에 연계되었는지를 증명했다. 더욱이, 본 사례연구는 공론장에 대해 선택적이지만 광범위하게 정부가 개입하는 것을 통하여 자유시장정책을 지지하고, 최소한의 정부간섭을 강조하는 신자유주의와는 대립적인 분질을 증명하였다. 본 논문은 신자유주의적 다문화주의는 구조적 그리고 이념적 유사성을 보여주는 것에 의해 지리적으로 그리고 기구적으로 다른 커뮤니케이션 상황에서도 유용할 수 있다는 것을 보여주고 있다.
“Sus Leyes son las Leyes de Zimri; pero Ellos esperan una Recompensa como Phineas”: Los Discursos Neoliberales y Multiculturales del Desarrollo de la Política de DTT Israeli
Roei Davidson
Department of Communication, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel

Resumen
Examinamos cómo los discursos neoliberales y multiculturales son empleados en el desarrollo de la Política de la Televisión Digital Terrestre (DTT) en Israel como un estudio de caso del despliegue de la tecnología de los medios en una sociedad que está caracterizada por profundos escotes sociales y una rápida neoliberalización. Conducimos un análisis detallado de los documentos oficiales publicados en un período de 6 años, incluyendo trabajos preparatorios, borradores de leyes, resúmenes de reuniones del comité parlamentario, discusiones parlamentarias plenarias, y la redacción de la ley hecha en Febrero del 2008. Este estudio subraya cómo el neoliberalismo multicultural opera como una retórica dominante que aboga por el derecho cultural y económico de las minorías, mientras que enmascara las posiciones de las políticas que niegan estos derechos. Demostramos cómo esto está conectado a la composición de los canales eventualmente incluidos en la plataforma sobre la DTT.