LOVE AND THE INTELLIGENCE

Junior Paper
Philosophy Department
Advisor: Mr. Rayman
S.G. Thatcher
May 8, 1964
This paper represents a first attempt to arrive at a satisfactory definition of the very much misunderstood and very much avoided (in philosophy) phenomenon of love. The paucity of material directly related to this topic which philosophy provides necessitated on my part wandering into other fields, e.g., religion, psychology, literature, to find support for my thesis, but then few philosophers escape this sort of thing altogether and they are not the best. It is surprising, indeed, that so little exists in philosophy which treats of love, especially in an age when such intense experiences as death, anxiety, suffering, and guilt play so central a role in continental "existentialist" philosophy and when all vague, ill-defined concepts are being subjected to the close, hair-splitting scrutiny of analytic philosophers.

Love -- if it exists -- should be given its due by philosophy, and it is just that which the general purpose underlying this paper proposes to do.

As a first attempt, this paper does not attempt much. Only one major point is made, and just to make this one point I felt it necessary to provide a great deal of documentation -- not all of which, either, agrees with my own view entirely (nor do the theories of the authors I quote in general agree with my complete view, which is presented only in part here and is more hinted at than presented, even). What is accomplished, if anything, I feel, is the laying of the groundwork for a more developed theory of love based on the primary importance (though not primacy) of knowledge -- hence the stress on the
intellect here -- and whose ultimate area of concern is ethics. The Christian notion of love, pre-eminently an ethical one, which is missing from the discussion in this paper, requires another paper in itself, and thus a full consideration of it could not be attempted here.

To give some clue as to where this paper leads and what my developed theory of love will be, I shall mark down the following (tentatively) as my ultimate aim: to show that, in love (and here I take love to mean what it must be, rather than what it should be or what it has been thought to be), and especially in love regarded as necessarily involving action, on the ethical plane, knowledge of the person one loves is so essential that to do without it is to destroy the ethical, if not personal, value of love and to return it to the level of "good intentions" and "right feelings". With that said, I begin.

(Note: This preface should be read both before and after the essay, especially since it was written afterwards.)
It is almost a commonplace today in writing about love, whenever a serious attempt is made, to place a great deal of emphasis on the distinction between what may be called the "mind and heart of love."¹ From Plato's time to the present this distinction has been integral to any and every discussion of love. In whatever terms this seeming antithesis has been couched -- whether the spiritual and the sensual, the mental and the physical, mind and emotion, or reason and passion -- it is clear that there is commonly felt among laymen as well as philosophers to be some sort of crucial difference between the "higher" and "lower" types of love, and heretofore it has almost always been the case that this difference has been thought to depend on the greater or lesser degree to which the mind and the "higher" functions of man have been active -- and active at all, not merely active in guiding and restraining the purely bestial elements in man's nature. Moral philosophy has in general added its weight to the popular view by rendering severe judgment upon that love which is "blind", passionate, and totally opposed to mind and spirit.

Those words which are ordinarily employed in making clear the distinction themselves point to the basis for it, and we do not have to look far to discover its origin. The time-honored dualistic conception of human nature, the old mind-body antithesis, undoubtedly serves as the metaphysical background for the contrast between the two loves. This idea, of course, was prevalent long before Descartes appeared to supply a philosophic argument for it, and may be found in the doctrines of many earlier philosophers, such as Plotinus, as well as in such

¹The title of M.C. D'Arcoy's book on the subject. See the bibliography.
ancient religions as Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. We may suspect, too, and not without reason, that the moral judgments made upon the two kinds of love have an ancient source in the Manichaean division between the good and evil principles in life. The Greeks, in spite of the Athenians' stress on the interdependence of a sound mind and a sound body, were also influenced by this idea, especially after their encounter with the Eastern religions, and, as Nietzsche pointed out in The Birth of Tragedy, the conflict between the "Apollonian" and "Dionysian" elements played a central role in the development of Greek culture. As for Greek philosophy as such, nowhere is this dualistic tendency more in evidence than in Plato's mythical treatment of love in the Phaedrus. There, and in the Symposium, Plato describes the steps by which the "fallen" soul can regain its wings, by progressing ultimately to the love of Beauty itself -- as though love were a matter of the mind only and the passion involved, if it was the proper passion and not the passion of the "wanton horse of the lover's soul", were only an incidental by-product of the mind's achievement.

In our times, perhaps, the opposite is true. Far from being considered an intellectual matter at all, love is conceived in the popular mind today as some sort of "feeling" or mysterious impulse which, if not strictly sensual, is at the very least passionate in nature and by no means requires any high degree of mental activity. We need, in fact, only look at a few Hollywood movies, listen to some popular songs, and read several articles in the women's magazines or a couple of pages from a current popular novel to be convinced of what love means (in a definitional sense) to people in our country
today. Anyone who was so bold as to suggest that perhaps love is more than just an "affair of the heart", that the mind plays more than a passive role, would probably meet with a good deal of ridicule or at least would hardly be listened to seriously. Whenever mind and emotion are discussed today as though somehow the two were by nature incompatible (geniuses have never been thought to make good lovers), love invariably winds up in the category of emotion. "Romance" is the word which best describes this sort of attitude towards love, and some writers, notably Denis de Rougemont in *Love in the Western World*, have actually sought to trace the current conception of love to the "courtly love" of the twelfth-century Provençal troubadours.\(^2\) Whatever its origin, however, we may be certain that the modern man gives little, if any, thought to the role of the intellect in that phenomenon he knows by the name of "love".

This attitude, I must assert before proceeding any further, is most certainly a mistaken one, and, if man is ever to come to understand the nature of that phenomenon truly (to say nothing of being able to love truly), he must become aware sooner or later of just how central a role his mind, and not only his mind in general but his *intellect*,\(^3\) plays in his loves -- and all his loves, of whatever sort they may be. I shall not go so far as Erich Fromm and say that love must be more than a feeling for, were it not so, then "there would be no basis for the promise to love each other forever"\(^4\) because that (i.e., the idea of

\(^2\) See Denis de Rougemont, "The Crisis of the Modern Couple" in *The Anatomy of Love*.

\(^3\) By "intellect" I take to mean those powers of the mind beyond those of mere perception, feeling, and will which may be grouped for convenience under the label "cognition".

\(^4\) Fromm, p. 56.
love as necessarily involving constancy and permanence) would exclude much of what has hitherto been called love, and I am not here trying to make a claim for what is and is not "true" love. I shall be satisfied simply with casting an eye on some of the major phenomena which have gone by that name, approaching the problem in an empirical rather than an ethical manner. But I am not for that reason unable to declare any less positively that love is not only a feeling.

"The passions are naturally blind."\(^5\) This statement by Santayana, though his purpose in making it may have been somewhat different from mine, sums up very nicely what it is that is lacking in any definition of love which detects its essence in the feelings which accompany it. Love, too, is blind perhaps but not in the sense that the mind is inactive when love is present. Wherever love is, there the mind is also, constantly perceiving, imagining, abstracting, comprehending -- not after love comes but in the very coming of it. Were it not for this activity of the mind, an activity which if anything is more heightened than normal, there would perhaps not even be feelings, and, if there were, they would be objectless, self-contained, and self-originating -- in short, blind. It is of the very nature of the word "love" that it signifies or implies something loved, and, when we love, we know what we love -- even if we have created it ourselves from the materials of our own imaginations. Feelings do not know. If in some vague sense they may be said to perceive, they certainly can neither imagine nor conceive. True, "thought alone moves nothing,"\(^6\) as Aristotle said, but without the aid of the intellect feelings are simply

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\(^5\) Santayana quoted in D'Aroy, p. 142.
\(^6\) Aristotle, p. 149.
left fumbling, feeding and turning back upon themselves without ever being released towards an object—a state which may produce acute restlessness, anxiety, or bliss but never love. Aristotle realized the importance of the intellect, too. For him it served as the guide for desire and was a prerequisite for moral action, its function being to point out the ends towards which desire could and should be directed. In the same way we may picture the intellect as a sort of super-intelligent "seeing-eye" dog which supplies eyes for the blind emotions.

Martin Buber in his famous book I and Thou makes a somewhat similar contrast between feelings and love. "Feelings accompany the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of love, but they do not constitute it... Feelings are "entertained": love comes to pass. Feelings dwell in man; but man dwells in his love. That is no metaphor, but the actual truth... love is between I and Thou. The man who does not know this, with his very being know this, does not know love; even though he ascribes to it the feelings he lives through, experiences, enjoys, and expresses." The problem with Buber's analysis, of course, is that he seems to repudiate the intellect along with feelings as integral to love in placing such great emphasis on the phenomenological and almost it seems, mystical experience of the "I-Thou" relation. M.C. D'Arcy takes note of this failing of Buber's in his study of The Mind and Heart of Love, attributing it to the influence of "Kant's distinction of two realms, one where human reason can work, and the other where faith must take its place." As he says later, too, Buber

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8D'Arcy, p. 139.
"failed to see that reason can still function though it has been shorn of some of its exclusive powers and had to call in aid from the outside. It is true that persons can escape the clutches of human reason, but a person is not a person without this reason, and it is to be expected, therefore, that in the meeting of persons reason should still operate as well as, shall we say, will or whatever activity it be that brings persons together in love. So we see again that there is something besides feelings and more important than feelings which enters into what we know as love. If we are to take D'Arcy's word for it, at least part of this extra something is the active intellect.

By this time the goal of my argument should be fairly evident. It is, quite simply, to establish that wherever there has occurred any phenomenon which men have called "love" there too is to be found an active intellect inextricably bound up with the birth, life, and death of that love. This proposition is really not so bold as it may at first seem because anyone who has ever encountered love in any of its forms feels, even if he does not know, that his whole being is engaged in the experience. The argument is directed mainly against those who still think in terms of a dualistic conception of love, and, since the prevailing attitude today sides with the emotional, passionate half, it is only natural to stress the importance of the other half, where the intellect takes the upper hand.

Before going on to meet and discuss three of the most common forms of love which exist in the present age, however, I must make several points clear in case there should be some

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9It is evident that D'Arcy's "reason" is analogous, if not identical with what I call "intellect".
10D'Arcy, p. 229. I, of course, am going farther than D'Arcy in claiming that it is the intellect which often "brings persons together".
confusion later. First, by "intellect" I do not mean reason in the sense in which it designates rationality. The way the intellect acts may more often than not turn out to be "irrational" where love is concerned. The word "intellect" is used here simply to indicate a class of operations of the mind -- association, comparison of ideas, imagination, conceptualization in particular -- which might in a group be called "cognition". Secondly, I am making no claim for the primacy of the intellect as opposed to feelings; both have roles which are probably equally important in the phenomenon of love. The function of the intellect, as pointed out above, may best be viewed as a guiding one. It does not produce feelings but simply directs them. Or, to use another analogy, borrowing from Aristotle again, we may consider the intellect as "form" and the passions as "matter"; the intellect imposes a certain peculiar structure on the undifferentiated raw material of the passions, thus giving rise to one particular "form" of love. Neither analogy is quite exact, of course, and neither may give enough credit to the role of feelings, but they do allow at least some idea of what I wish to say to be grasped easily. Thirdly, to account for the susceptibility of some persons to certain types of love rather than others, we may refer to Jung's conception of a "monopolistic investment" in a particular mode of experience -- a phenomenon in which apparently the feelings, or "affects", exercise a kind of control over the intellect, forcing it to engage more exclusively in one particular function, such as imagination.11 Thus we speak of a "romantic" man (where imagination is central) or

11See Tomkins, pp. 135-6.
of a born lover of mankind (where conceptualization is the chief factor). This is not to deny, of course, that change and development from one mode of love to another is possible, too. Only it seems somewhat more difficult to account for permanence or fixation than for change on my theory.

The type of love which presents the most difficult challenge to the thesis I am trying to establish I shall consider first. It goes by various names -- erotic love, sensual love, sex -- but to avoid euphemisms as well as to keep in mind that it is a kind of love I shall call it simply "sexual love". What must be done at the very outset is to distinguish between "sexual love" and "sexual instinct". Obviously, any argument which tried to show that all sexual activity, even all of man's sexual activity, involved the operation of the intellect would not get far. Restricting the discussion to man, it is not unreasonable to suspect that there are cases in which man is really no more than a beast when he succumbs completely to a blind sexual drive, but it is by no means as obvious as might be supposed. Indeed, some writers have raised doubts about such "pure" cases. José Ortega Y Gasset, for instance, has this to say on the matter: "sexual instinct, strictly speaking, practically does not exist in man, but is almost always found to be indissolubly united, at least with fantasy."12 Further, "if man did not possess such an excellent, fertile imagination, he would not 'love' sexually, as he does, upon every possible occasion. Most of the consequences imputed to instinct do not spring from it. If they did, they would also appear in the animal."13 He goes on later

12 Ortega Y Gasset, p. 102.
13 Ibid., pp. 102-5.
to put the point somewhat differently. "I regret that I cannot accept the separation... between what is physical and what is psychical. It is false, and completely false, that we see 'only' a body [which would be the case if only instinct were involved] when we see, in fact, a human figure before us."

The point is that sexual instinct is blind while sexual love is not. The latter "sees" the object of its desire through the windows of the intellect.

The most famous theory which tried to reduce all love to a more or less diluted and diverted instinct was the one propounded by Freud and his school. His idea is that the original and spontaneous drive for sexual satisfaction in man in every case comes up in the course of development (in society) against two impossible barriers -- "the very strong incestuous fixation of childhood and the frustration by reality suffered during adolescence." Having been diverted from its original aim, the sexual drive is then forced to clothe itself in the more innocent and harmless-looking garb of love in order to achieve at least some degree of satisfaction. Unfortunately it is usually only a degree of satisfaction that is attained, and in many instances the result is a love which is "psychically impotent". On a grander scale Freud developed this idea into a full-fledged view of civilization and introduced (though he did not invent) the important concept of sublimation to account for the transformation of the direct expression of the sex drive into the more culturally acceptable forms of expression.

14Ibid., p. 109.
16See Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents.
aware of Freud's view that "love with an inhibited aim
was indeed originally full of sensual love, and in man's
unconscious mind is so still."17

What can be said in opposition to this view? Much has
been said, of course, and Freud has suffered attacks from
all sides, many of which, it must be admitted, are highly
unjust though many, too, are just as surely valid criticisms.
One modern psychologist of note has recently developed a
theory as a direct reaction to Freud's idea of sex. The
essence of this new theory may be summed up by saying that
the drives *s.e.x.* have been found to be an inadequate basis
on which to explain the transformability Freud claimed to
be an inherent capacity of the sex drive and on which to
account for the degree of freedom humans are capable of.

What is to be substituted -- a theory based on the "affect
system" -- may not seem much better, but at least it serves
to point out several of Freud's errors. "Activities as re-

mote from sexuality as writing love poetry [for instance]
are not substitutes for sexuality per se. Nor should they
have been called instances of sublimation... The lover may
write erotic poetry calculated to arouse himself and the
beloved sexually, or he may write love poetry or he may
write erotic love poetry. Only in the first case are we
dealing with simple partial substitute sexual satisfaction."18

Clearly, if the very objective of the drive, sexual satisfaction,
disappears in the process of transformation, even though the
"libidinal" energy remains, it is incorrect to speak of sub-

limation. 19 "Substitution" would be a better word. More

17 Freid quoted in Fromm, p. 90.
18 Tomkins, p. 142.
19 See Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 190-2.
important for the purpose of stressing the role of the
intellect in sexual love is this passage: "Neither the
yearnings, the intimations of infinity and immortality in
the hearts of lovers nor the excitement and shame of those
who dare the profane and violate the taboo appears in the
sexual experience of any other animal. Man's capability of
investing this act with such significance is a consequence
of his freedom to combine his affects and ideas in his image
of sex."20 Here again we see the differentiation of sexual
love and sexual instinct that Gasset emphasized, a distinction
which rests to no small degree on the active functioning of the
intellect.

Theodor Reik, another psychologist who grew up with Freud's
theory and who, as he says, "grew out of it", takes a similar
attitude towards his former teacher. Love, he claims, is
"not a biological need, because there are millions of people
who do not feel it and many centuries and cultural patterns
in which it is unknown."21 Now it is not necessary for us to
go as far as to take love altogether out of the realm of sex,
as Reik seems here and in other places to be doing, in order
to see some of the points he is trying to make. Again, the
argument tends towards asserting the blindness of sex by itself.
"Sex is originally objectless. Love certainly is not."22 This
idea was suggested by Gasset, too. "As distinguished from
love' pure voluptuousness -- we could say pure impurity --
exists prior to its object. One feels desire before knowing
the person or situation which satisfies it."23 Reik continues.

20Tomkins, p. 460.
22Ibid.
23Ortega Y Gasset, pp. 35-6.
"The sexual object has to have certain physical qualities which excite or arouse one. If they are lacking, one remains indifferent. [I might interject that I think Reik even here is attributing too much discriminatory power to instinct.] Not so the love object. It has to have certain psychical qualities which are highly valued."24 Further, "sex... is undiscriminating. It wants 'a woman'. It is modest in its demands. But love always makes a choice. It is highly discriminating."25 Reik sums up his comments with the following.

"The theory of Freud that sex and love are of the same substance is not only founded on a preconceived idea; it is as fanciful as any poetical concept of love, but more fanciful and less poetic. Simply calling love aim-inhibited sex does not make it sex."26

These criticisms may not, it is true, be totally convincing though it is certain there is some validity in each of them. Perhaps the most devastating argument against Freud is the one found among other places in Walter Kaufmann's Critique of Religion and Philosophy. There the point is made that, "even if we grant the existence of an early incestuous desire, there is no reason whatsoever to believe -- and Freud himself adduces none -- that gratification of this early desire would markedly change later behaviour."27 Now what is remarkable about this criticism is that it has a sound basis in some of Freud's own writing. Kaufmann quotes:

But unrestricted sexual freedom from the beginning does not lead to any better result. It is easy to show that the psychic value of

25 Ibid., p. 178.
26 Ibid., p. 173.
27 Kaufmann, p. 420.
the need for love goes down at once, as soon as its satisfaction is made easy. It requires an obstacle to drive the libido up to a high point, and where the natural obstacles to satisfaction are not sufficient, men have at all times interposed conventional ones to be able to enjoy love. 28

This admission by Freud is crucial. What it amounts to, for my theory, is a strong piece of evidence for the claim that, even if the sexual drive were always allowed to achieve its objective, the human intellect would still function and give a peculiar form to man's sexual interests. Freud's error, as M. C. D'Arcy points out, lay in general in not seeing what there is unique and different in man's sexual activities. Freud and other psychologists "start with our human experience and by comparing it in its most primitive and vital manifestations with the behaviour of animals, they arrive at certain conclusions about the sensations and instincts and feelings of all living things. The temptation on their side is to deny that our human experience is specifically distinct from that of our animal cousins, to omit from their account the spiritual self." 29 It would not be difficult to show that by "spiritual self" D'Arcy means to a large extent what I have called "intellect". Thus we see that in man's sexual love the intellect has a decidedly significant part to play. What that part is -- whether what is involved is perception, intuition, association, or some sort of comprehension -- does not matter greatly here. It is enough to show that it does have such a part.

The second type of love that I wish to consider is one which at the same time but in different ways both reveals and hides the

28 Freud quoted in Kaufmann, p. 420.
29 D'Arcy, p. 246.
role the intellect plays in forming it. It is that sometimes very ambiguous love which men have called "romantic". what I mean by saying that it both hides and reveals the intellect is simply this: whenever any serious attempt is made to describe and analyze the workings of romantic love in theoretical or even literary terms, it is immediately obvious that this phenomenon would not exist were it not for the aspects the intellect contributes to it: whereas the term "romantic" itself and the popularization of romantic love in all its unlikely places it appears today -- "from literary mysticism to the subway billboards," \^{30} as Denis de Rougement aptly puts it -- hardly ever suggest that there is anything more than, at most, "divine" feelings which go into the making of it. My purpose, of course, is to reveal the role of the intellect; therefore, I shall confine my efforts to a study of two well-known theories of romantic love without seeking to explain how the intellect disappears in the popular conception of it.

Undoubtedly one of the most illuminating and fascinating accounts of romantic love is found in Stendhal's famous *On Love*. His presentation of love-all but defines it as a phenomenon of the intellect, and at the very least it is certain that the function he assigns the intellect is constitutive of the very essence of the romantic love he describes. The principle mark of his theory is in the process he calls "crystallization". The origin of this idea reveals its meaning:

In the salt mines of Salzburg a bough stripped of its leaves by winter is thrown into the depths of the disused workings; two or three months later it is pulled out

\^{30}Quoted by Philip Q. Roche in a footnote in *The Anatomy of Love*, p. 215.
again, covered with brilliant crystals; even the tiniest twig, no bigger than a tomtit's claw, are spangled with a vast number of shimmering, glittering diamonds, so that the original bough is no longer recognizable.  

Similarly Stendhal explains, when a person falls in love, he cannot help but beautify the perhaps not so "glittering" object of his affection with a thousand shining perfections — all of which, of course, proceed from his own quite active imagination. This observation was not, however, original with Stendhal. Long before his time that immortal disciple of Epicurus, Lucretius, was quite well aware of this tendency on the part of lovers and poked fun at it in his writings.  

...A sallow wench is acclaimed as a nut-brown maid. A sluttish slattern is admired for her 'sweet disorder'. Her eyes are never green, but grey as Athene's. If she is stringy and woody, she is lithe as a gazelle. A stunted runt is a sprite, a sheer delight from top to toe. A clumsy giantess is 'a daughter of the gods' divinely tall. She has an impediment in her speech — a charming lisp, of course. She's as mute as a stockfish — what modesty! A waspish, fiery-tempered scold — she's 'burns with a gem-like flame'. She becomes 'svelte' and 'willowy' when she is almost too skinny to live; 'delicate' when she is half-dead with coughing...  

Stendhal, though, goes one step further and claims that the "crystallization" process hardly depends on the qualities of the object at all. It not only changes the qualities perceived to their opposites in order to perfect them, it even invents them or, as Gasset remarks in an essay on Stendhal, "it makes the external object for which we live a mere projection of the

31 Stendhal, pp. 6-7.  
32 Lucretius, p. 166.
individual.\textsuperscript{33} The process may, indeed, be likened to the creation of a work of art in which what is produced is inseparable from the mind which produced it. This may help to explain why the separation of the lover from his beloved plays so prominent a role in romantic love, for, if the lover were constantly in the presence of his loved one, other functions of the intellect such as perception and knowledge would pre-empt the key position held by the imagination and would stifle the possibility of free artistic creation. One psychologist has found in this phenomenon a "universal response" to what he calls "disenchantment" and ends by remarking that "man's capacity for falling in love with his own creations is at the root of his most intense delight and of his deepest despair."\textsuperscript{34} Stendhal would most probably agree, at least with the latter remark. In any case none could deny that the imaginative activity of the intellect lies at the very heart of romantic love.

Little less than a century after Stendhal's book appeared another famous French author presented his views of love in the form of a novel. The author, Marcel Proust, developed in Swann's Way a theory of love which bears so striking a resemblance to his predecessor's that one cannot help but see a direct connection. The theories are not identical, however. Whereas the distinguishing mark of Stendhal's theory is imaginative creation, the Proustian theory relies for its uniqueness on imaginative association. What is meant by "association" is made clear in the long chapter entitled "Swann in Love". There we see Swann's love for Odette come to life and sustain itself by association.

\textsuperscript{33}Ortega Y Gasset, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{34}Tomkins, pp. 450-1.
with certain works of art which appeal to his aesthetic sensibilities. First there is the "little musical phrase" from the sonata by Vinteuil, which Swann comes to call the "national anthem" of his love for Odette. Then, and even more important, there is Botticelli's painting depicting "Jethro's Daughter" Zipporah which Swann seeks to identify in his mind with Odette. Whereas before "the mere sight of her in the flesh, by perpetually reviving his misgivings as to the quality of her face, her figure, the whole of her beauty, used to cool the ardour of his love, those misgivings were swept away and that love confirmed now that he could re-erect his estimate of her on the sure foundation of his aesthetic principles." 35 Proust is not satisfied, however, with handing to the intellect a merely secondary role in strengthening love; he insists at another point that the intellect actually helps to create love. "It [love] no longer evolves by itself... We come to its aid; we falsify it by memory and by suggestion; recognizing one of its symptoms we recall and recreate the rest." 36 He agrees, too, with Stendhal about the creative function of the intellect but goes beyond him in implying that this phenomenon is by no means limited to the love relationship.

... our social personality is created by the thoughts of other people. Even the simple act which we describe as 'seeing some one we know' is, to some extent, an intellectual process. We pick the physical outline of the creature we see with all the ideas we have already formed about him, and in the complete picture of him which we compose in our minds those ideas have certainly the principal

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35 Proust, p. 322.
36 Ibid., p. 281.
place. In the end they come to fill out so completely the curve of his cheeks, to follow so exactly the line of his nose, they blend so harmoniously in the sound of his voice that these seem to be no more than a transparent envelope, so that each time we see the face or hear the voice it is our own ideas of him which we recognize and to which we listen. 37

Froust's idea here lends an additional note of strength to my thesis. If the intellect necessarily acts in this fashion where even the simplest human relationship is involved, certainly it will do so in the case of love. Romantic love and the intellect, then, cannot be separated.

An interesting transition to the last type of love I intend to describe may be seen in this passage from J. 38

Sartre's The Psychology of the Imagination:

...when Annie is gone my feelings for her change in nature. No doubt I continue to call them love, and I no doubt deny the change, pretending that I love her when absent just as much and in the same way as when she is present. But that is not so... the feeling is debased since its richness, its inexhaustible depth comes from the object; there is always more to love in the object than I actually love... By an essential reversal it is now the feeling [I would say "intellect"] that produces its object and the unreal Annie is no more than the strict correlative of my feelings for her. It follows that the feeling is never more than what it is. It now has a basic poverty... it becomes of love in general and becomes somewhat rationalized; it is now that by-word sentiment which psychologists and novelists describe... Barren, scholastic, abstract, directed towards an unreal object which itself has lost its individuality, it evolves slowly towards the empty absolute. 38

37 Ibid., pp. 25-6.
38 Sartre, pp. 206-8.
What we see here at work is a mind which lacks the creativity of the romantic mind but one which is quite well suited to realizing the abstract in things and dealing with generalities — a mathematician’s mind, you might say. All that is required to make this passage a perfect illustration of the third type of love is the substitution for the single person “Annie” of the concept “mankind”. Then we have the love I call “humanistic love”.

The Platonic conception gives us a good idea about the nature of this love. As C.S. Lewis points out in an essay on “Courtly Love”, it may well be that love in Plato’s view starts at the lowest rung of the “ladder” with a single object. “But this is a ladder in the strictest sense; you reach the higher rungs by leaving the lower ones behind. The original object of human love… has simply fallen out of sight before the soul arrives at the spiritual [I would say “abstract”] object.” 39 So, too, those who love “man” are rarely capable of loving men. The original person they loved — if there was one at all — has simply disappeared in the process of abstraction. He becomes reduced to a summation of general attributes which go into making up the definition of “man”. What is particular about him and what makes him an individual is seldom loved by the humanist and more often than not actually renders him loathsome to the person who loves him only as a member of the species “man”. Dostoyevsky illustrates this point in The Brothers Karamazov:

“‘I love humanity,’ he said, ‘but I wonder at

myself. The more I love humanity in general, the less I love man in particular. In my dreams, he said, I have often come to making enthusiastic schemes for the service of humanity, and perhaps I might actually have faced crucifixion if it had been suddenly necessary; and yet I am incapable of living in the same room with any one for two days together...

In twenty-four hours I begin to hate the best of men. One because he has a cold and keeps on blowing his nose. I become hostile to people the moment they come close to me. But it has always happened that the more I detest men individually the more ardent becomes my love for humanity."40

Or, as Ivan says, later in the same book, "I could never understand how one can love one's neighbors. It's just one's neighbors, to my mind, that one can't love, though one might love those at a distance."41 We do not have to ask for an explanation here of why some men can only love man in the abstract so much as we have at least to realize that this does occur. Perhaps there may be some sort of "monopolistic investment" in this mode of experience, as I suggested once before, but it is sufficient to know that humanistic love is a real phenomenon in order to appreciate the critical role the intellect plays here, and that is all I need to make clear. That there are humanists today who emphasize this type of love perhaps I can demonstrate by citing some choice sentences from Erich Fromm's The Art of Loving.

"If I truly love one person," he says, "I love all persons, I love the world, I love life. If I can say to somebody else, 'I love you,' I must be able to say, 'I love in you everybody, I love through you the world, I love in you myself."42 That

40Dostoyevsky, p. 64.
41Ibid., p. 281.
42Fromm, p. 46.
so far is not unreasonable, but, when he goes on to claim that "the differences in talents, intelligence, knowledge are negligible in comparison with the identity of the human core common to all men," surely he is passing beyond the bounds of personal love. "If I perceive in another person mainly the surface, I perceive mainly the differences, that which separates us. If I penetrate to the core, I perceive our identity, the fact of our brotherhood." Isn't that precisely what humanistic love is, a love which ignores the distinct, personal traits in favor of the abstract, common qualities? Fromm bears out our suspicions when he continues with statements such as: "in essence, all human beings are identical" and "this being so, it should not make any difference whom we love." To be perfectly honest, Fromm should have added "since in loving 'man' we are really not loving any 'men' at all." Then it would have been clear how entirely "intellectual" this sort of love is. Humanistic love is, in fact, almost solely the work of the intellect. There is little sense in trying further, then, to point out the place of the intellect in this love. It would perhaps be more interesting and more difficult, too, to determine in what way feelings enter into the constitution of humanistic love -- if that were the task of this paper. 

What is missing from this study of love and the intellect is a treatment of the Christian concept of love, without which, of course, no paper on love can ever be complete. It has been omitted for three reasons: first, my own knowledge of the

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43 Ibid., p. 47.
44 Ibid.
subject is not yet, I feel, sufficient to enable me to do full justice to all its complexities; secondly, there is, besides, no consensus of opinion among Christian laymen and theologians themselves as to the true nature of Christian love -- one would have to speak of the Christian concept of love if one were to be entirely impartial; and, thirdly, there is simply not space enough to discuss it. I feel convinced, however, that a thorough study of Christian love would not in any way invalidate the conclusion of this paper -- that love and the activity of the intellect are inextricably bound up with one another in any real occurrence of that phenomenon.

Concerning the problem of mind-body dualism, the implications of this paper should be clear. It may seem that by separating the intellect from the feelings in discussing love I have myself introduced some sort of similar dualism, but such was not at all my intent. I must insist once again that love is a matter involving both feelings and intellect, mind and body -- in short, the whole person. What is this person? The question is surely a valid one. I can answer it now only by referring to the view of Gerard Hopkins or of P.F. Strawson and by saying that the category of "person" is somehow prior to the categories of "mind" and "body", which exist only as abstractions.46 M.C. D'Arcy would agree, too. "The 'I' who makes the body and spirit one being and owns

46 In connection with this point it would be interesting to develop the thought that the basis of Christian love may reside in this very "person". The purely rational is the universal (and leads, like Kantian ethics, directly to the humanistic sort of love) but Christian love is pre-eminently that which transcends the ethical, as universal, as Kierkegaard pointed out, and takes into consideration the individuality and uniqueness of the "neighbor", which cannot be isolated either in the mind or body by itself.
both and is responsible for the combined action of the two, is the individual who is subsistent -- not the body, nor the spirit by itself." And again, "the person must be looked for not as an extra, something outside the concrete, human and existing being, nor again in the concrete human nature or essence by itself." Mind and body are abstractions. The "person" is both, though nothing beyond them. As Sartre would say, "I exist my body." Both together constitute the self. In Gasset's words, "it is very difficult for us, supposing that it can be done at all, to separate and abstract the body from the soul [in personal experience, "everyday" experience]. Not only when living with another human being but even in a casual relationship, the visual image we have of a person's body is simultaneous with our psychical perception of his soul or quasi-soul. Just so, love is a phenomenon in which there can be no gap ever experienced separating any two parts of the person from each other, whether mind and body or intellect and feelings. All intermingle and all take part in love. This paper has taken for its theme the intimate connection of the intellect with love simply because there is a tendency today to disregard its role. There was not meant to be any hint of disparagement in regard to feelings or any denial of the equally intimate connection of feelings with love, and there may come a day when the feelings will cry out for recognition instead of the intellect. Until that day my side of the argument must be considered the right one to take by all those who insist upon the fundamental unity of personal experience and personal existence.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


